A fascinating and reasonably plausible discussion of the various alternative factors operative in the evolutionary development of a moral sense, so long as one subscribes to the limited parameters constituting the "rules of the game" for this discussion (and this discussion only), namely that no "spiritual truths" factors are operative in any way, shape, or form. The presumed non-existence of any form of "spiritual truths" reflecting cause-and-effect mechanisms either good for the species as a whole, or good for the individual (whether in a single lifetime karmic-continuum scenario or in a multi-lifetime karmic-continuum scenario) is so standard for Western philosophical thinking that the reaction: "Well, duh, but of course!..." is the typical response. (The supposed obviousness of the presumed non-existence of the above is underpinned to no small extent by defaulting to the old-physics frame involving only a single big bang in a single universe [as opposed to Steinhardt's multi-verse, multi-big-bang] and also by defaulting to presumed non-existence of astro-biological [aka "exo-biological"] factors [for which see Zimmer's Science-Saturday "e-coli" edition], and also, by extension, defaulting to non-existence of astro-spiritual [aka "exo-spiritual"] factors.) (But this very same sort of "default-grounding" was also once true for philosophical and religious discussions' presumed grounding in concepts such as "the flat-world," an "earth-centric" universe around

I love the combo of these two, once again, great diavlog. I hope they keep it going. The early discussion on 'what a thing is for' was interesting. Sayre-McCord talked about how knowing 'what a thing is for' is not necessarily to know what is good for it as an individual, and I found that illuminating. One more feature of this kind of reasoning I think, is that we have no reason to think that nature has a purpose, aim, goal, or telos. Let me revise that a bit: we don't find these things (aims) to be discoverable through the sciences. So we should just be clear; if we say that a thing is for something, then we're imposing this concept on nature. And as long as we're imposing a concept on nature, what would limit us after that? I mean, why stop at Teleology? I say this because sometimes the type of thinking which states that a thing has a function, therefore we can say whether or not the thing is good based on whether this thing performs its function... sometimes this type of thinking seems parsimonious or modest or, not-mystical. But I see no reason why this view shouldn't qualify as a form

EW, Can you elaborate on that a little for me? I'm not sure if you're trying to make sure we don't include something like spirituality, if you're bemoaning its absence.

It was, in fact, very, very hot in Chapel Hill.

http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/117...4:51&out=35:28 Speaking as a female chemical engineer (bucking the trend towards baby-making, I know), the discrepancy arises from the fact that alcohol and water have stronger molecular interactions between each other than either substance alone, decreasing the molar volume. But, you know, 1+1=2 is still a good approximation and furthermore we have mathematical models to describe the actual discrepancy. It was a common refrain in my thermodynamics class as we moved from "first principles" to more complex descriptions of reality that "this isn't thermodynamics, this is just calculus". Anyway, a further discussion of the relation between abstract thought, math and reality is a diavlog I'd really like to see. I found the discussion to be very interesting and even a little cathartic. My father throughout his life has found a semi-acceptable outlet for his sexism by embracing the morality-follows-function concept discussed and it has become so popular recently that I rarely see anyone even thinking about the precept that maybe it's wrong. However, I sometimes feel that trying to explain anything through the lens of "evolution made this" might be entirely futile due to the existence of vestigial attributes. Exhibit A - the human sinus cavity. The

Great diavlog. Will had the perfect balance of interjecting his own knowledge and questions and at the same letting Geoff speak. I especially liked that Geoff could sit in silence for a second or two thinking and Will didn't feel compelled to fill the time. Bravo! I know it's very difficult.

Quoting travis68: I especially liked that Geoff could sit in silence for a second or two thinking and Will didn't feel compelled to fill the time. Bravo! I know it's very difficult.

That same thought struck me, too. That's the mark of a good listener -- when you're attuned enough to the speaker's rhythm that you're not thrown off by such a pause.

I wish Geoff had given an example when in the last minute he was claiming that there were instances when one side of two competing moral values is flat out wrong. I am sure that he had an example in his head and he was abstracting from that example. In the future, remember that it is always good to give an example along with the abstraction. My sense is that once you have moved away from the extremes of either position (eg. justice and benevolence), saying that the other side is just wrong doesn't seem very fruitful. For example, once you introduce the idea of some type of tax to support the poor, thus compromising justice but at the same time boosting benevolence, you are then arguing about what level of tax and what level of benevolence. How can you say that one side is wrong in that debate?

travis68, I'm not positive about this, but I think what Geoff was getting at was that the concept of justice perhaps has some descriptive features, and that to use the concept properly in a debate is to give deference to some of those features. It seems like Will was trying to give an example when he talked about how a friend may be wrong about a movie being "just OK" rather than "great" if your friend's opinion is based on an ignorance of some of the movies key features, maybe because your friend failed to notice those features. What tends to interest and haunt me is that even after you educate your friend, there may still be disagreement. Of course it's the form of the argument that's haunting me here, since what really matters to me is that we could replace the content and plug in a moral disagreement, where both sides are equally informed and sophisticated, but disagreement remains. Back to the point about Geoff talking about one side being flat wrong... I think there was some concern in philosophy some years back that talking about

Hi Iml45, I think Hume's is/ought distinction is even more devastating to your Dad's position, or anyone's moral position for that matter. On abstract thought, math, and reality, did you see the diavlog a while back with Margaret Wertheim? err, I seem to be having trouble getting the specific sections called up. So if you follow the link, http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/336# and click first on the section titled, "How science killed God the Redeemer" there's some interesting discussion on the ancient history of the metaphysical views of math pretty much for the whole section, which is a little over 9 minutes. Then starting at about the 10:20 mark (and ending at about the 14:00 mark) of the section titled, "Wriggling out of the straitjacket of determinism with help from physics," Wertheim expresses her view and mentions this book: http://www.amazon.com/Infinitum-Ghos.../dp/0804721289 Her view and the view of the author are pretty non-Platonic. For a more Platonic realist view, this audio discussion may be of interest: http://www.philosophytalk.org/pastShows/Number.html This last one I haven't listened to, but it looks interesting: http://www.philosophytalk.org/pastSh...andtheMind.htm Even with these sources, I would love to see a diavlog about abstract thought, math, and reality as well.

Quoting Jay J: I would love to see a diavlog about abstract thought, math, and reality as well.

...featuring Brian Rotman, author of Ad Infinitum, please!

The other problem with this position (which is being ascribed to your father) is that it is easily reduced to absurdity by being inverted: so let's say the putative role of males was hunting savage beasts - do we conclude that men would only be happy hunting savage beasts since that is the role they evolved to? None of this tells you who should be building the cars, doing the investment banking, running the dishwasher or running the government. This is a vacuous position even before you get to Geoff's caveat. BTW congratulations on the chem eng. I think Geoff's 1+1 example was a little unfortunate since it really isn't 1+1, when they are different things. More like being surprised if A+B doesn't always equal 2A.

I can’t help wondering if a lot of “moral” judgment is really just the assessment of a cost/benefit ratio for a certain behavior and the assignment of a normative value on the basis of that ratio relative to the current needs of the individual and/or Society. How do we know that our moral sentiments and norms don’t vary over time and from place to place and from person to person primarily because of the varying costs and benefits of certain behaviors, or because of differences/changes in the assignment of the relative value of different costs and benefits, or because of differences in what are considered legitimate costs and benefits? For example, at this point in time, we find it immoral to require women to have children or to limit women to the childbearing role. But should fertility rates drop low enough, would we begin to think it immoral to not have children, or more moral to have them than to not? Would we begin to assign a normative value to something we consider beyond the scope of moral judgment at present? Would it

Quoting Me&theboys: I can’t help wondering if a lot of “moral” judgment is really just the assessment of a cost/benefit ratio for a certain behavior and the assignment of a normative value on the basis of that ratio relative to the current needs of the individual and/or Society.

Hello Me&,
That "and/or" straddles so much it's rather hard to answer. According to the utilitarian, the moral thing to do (without the scare quotes) is whatever maximizes the net benefit (not to the agent, but) to ALL parties involved together. You add up the benefits of each course of action to every individual involved and you subtract the harms to every individual involved (counting the king's and the beggar's harms and benefits equally) [the difference, not the ratio is important]. Whichever course of action produces the best outcome is the morally right course of action.
Your use of scare quotes suggests you have a more "debunking" explanation of morality in mind, but if you include the utilitarian account within the scope of alternatives you are including in that "and/or", then there is not anything automatically suspect or debunking about this characterization of morality.

How do we know that

On the one hand you agreed that moral intuitions of proper behavior should trump evolved functions of behavior, and on the other you agreed that moral intuitions evolved to serve a purpose of promoting the function of cooperation to maximize joint reproductive fitness. If so, why doesn't it make sense to reject evolved intuitions whenever they actually conflict with joint reproductive fitness? Why embrace the random errors in our evolved intuitions? And why is joint reproductive fitness so morally good anyway?

There was a LOT going on in the last few minutes of this diavlog -- a lot of interesting and seemingly related claims that could use a bit of untangling. Will begins with the thought that humans might start out with a number of impulses or instinctual modules that might conflict: aggressive and cooperative impulses, for instance. From this he quickly shifts to the (significantly different) claim that different values may be in some sense "incommensurable" (not a word he uses here). The classical utilitarian believes that there is a single yard-stick of value -- pleasure/pain. If you could measure pleasure and pain, the classical utilitarian thinks you could reduce moral questions in principle to a calculation -- add up pleasures, subtract pains and you have measured the moral value of each of your alternatives. If values are incommensurable, at a minimum, this means that no such single dimension of value exists: evaluating states of affairs morally will not be a matter of calculation, but rather a matter of "balancing" several different values.
If there is no algorithm that can calculate overall value, does it follow that this "balancing" is entirely beyond rational

If we assume that humans are the product of natural selection (as the diavloggers and I do), then all our capacities must have an evolutionary explanation -- including our capacities to perceive the world, to do math and science and to make moral judgments. But it doesn't follow that the best way to do physics or math or to make moral judgments is to study the evolution of these capacities. This is clearly not the case with respect to physics or math. The best way to work on those subjects is to think directly about those subjects: you start with common sense and experience and work through the puzzles that arise within common sense, and as you resolve these puzzles you start to leave untutored common sense behind.
Why should we think that evolutionary accounts of our capacity to make moral judgments is any more central to the actual business of ethics than evolutionary accounts of our ability to do physics would be to the actual business of physics?
Only if we believe that ethical common sense cannot be developed into

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: But it doesn't follow that the best way to do physics or math or to make moral judgments is to study the evolution of these capacities. This is clearly not the case with respect to physics or math. The best way to work on those subjects is to think directly about those subjects: you start with common sense and experience and work through the puzzles that arise within common sense, and as you resolve these puzzles you start to leave untutored common sense behind.
Why should we think that evolutionary accounts of our capacity to make moral judgments is any more central to the actual business of ethics than evolutionary accounts of our ability to do physics would be to the actual business of physics?
Only if we believe that ethical common sense cannot be developed into a more consistent theoretical whole in the way I suggested, is there any reason to do evolutionary ethics. I'm not saying that we can't inquire into the evolutionary question of how we got the capacity to make the moral judgments we do. I'm

It seems to me that the problem with "driving" people towards life situations which may not maximize happiness can be alleviated by "driving" them towards the idea that they can choose whatever they believe will make them happy. For instance, our educational system should make females comfortable with the idea that they could be, say, a chemist if that's what they think they want to do, while at the same time making them feel as if it is not at all necessary that they become a chemist if they think doing so might interfere with the happiness they could accrue from motherhood. The value of Evolutionary Psychology is not that we need to follow our evolved impulses, but that we understand why such impulses exist and, by doing so, be better able to overcome them if we so choose. To simply ignore evolutionary drives would be foolhardy - but that doesn't mean glorifying them.

Of course I completely agree with you (don't we all here worship at the alter of EP here by virtue of Mr Wright?). It gives excellent insights into why we want what we want. I think there are four levels of caveats:
1. we understand our evolutionary background imperfectly as yet, so predictions are likely to be inaccurate;
2. drawing direct analogies between our evolutionary background and the present day is tricky (the point of my post);
3. just because an action appears to increase your progeny doesn't mean you should do it (Geoff's point, though I think he was a bit "light")
4. individuals differ, so applying any model to a particular case is also tricky.

Quoting AemJeff: Math and physics have as topics subjects other than humans, while ethics is explicitly self referential. The evolution of our capacity to do the former two is ultimately unrelataed to what they describe. I don't believe that could be said about ethics. The evolution of our understanding of ethics and the evolution of ethics can't be unrelated in the same way that our understanding of physics is independent of the behavior of the physical world. I can't help but come to the opposite conclusion as you have in regard to the utility of the study of evolutionary ethics within the overall project of understanding ethics itself.

An inquiry into the human practices of mathematical inquiry and physical inquiry are ALSO "self-referential" -- and that is what I am comparing to the inquiry into the human practice of moral thinking.
I probably wasn't careful enough to make this clear, but I'm comparing the sociology of physics and math with the sociology or anthropology of moral thought.
Let me see if I can be clearer this time.
Normative questions are clearly part of ethics -- we don't just want to know

Hi Bloggin, When you say: "If we view evolutionary explanations of our moral views (explanations which in no way invoke the truth of the moral claims they explain) as complete, then we have accepted a debunking explanation of our moral views." I completely agree with this. But when you say: "But to accept such a debunking explanation, we must have reason to believe that ethical inquiry does not and cannot work on its own terms. And to believe this, we need evidence that it does not work on its own terms." Now this makes me scratch my head a bit... It seems to me that we could accept such a debunking explanation, without also believing that ethical inquiry does not and cannot work on its own terms. So first, I think it's important for me to get clear on what moral inquiry is. I mean, we have normative practices, and certainly some of them involve a questioning or searching phase of development, so I would call that moral inquiry. But if you have a different view then we would be talking past each other until we got clear on what we mean. Moving on just

Quoting Jay J: Hi Bloggin,

When you say:

"If we view evolutionary explanations of our moral views (explanations which in no way invoke the truth of the moral claims they explain) as complete, then we have accepted a debunking explanation of our moral views."

I completely agree with this.

But when you say:

"But to accept such a debunking explanation, we must have reason to believe that ethical inquiry does not and cannot work on its own terms. And to believe this, we need evidence that it does not work on its own terms."

Now this makes me scratch my head a bit... It seems to me that we could accept such a debunking explanation, without also believing that ethical inquiry does not and cannot work on its own terms.

So first, I think it's important for me to get clear on what moral inquiry is. I mean, we have normative practices, and certainly some of them involve a questioning or searching phase of development, so I would call that moral inquiry. But if you have a different view then we would be talking past each other until we got clear on what we mean.

Moving on just

Bloggin, Good to hear from you again, Have you gotten a chance to peek at our thread on compatibalism, etc? I posted a reply trying to get a grip on our respective views on what causation is and such. But... to try and get a grip on what we mean here, maybe the biggest problem I have, to deal with that first, is the formulation, 1. If we have accepted a debunking explanation of morality, then 2. We have reason to believe that moral inquiry cannot and does not work on its own terms. This seems too deductive to me, and it seems in step with what you said in the post I quoted you from. When I say that a debunking explanation can be seen as separate from our moral practice, I wish to stress *can* because I see the possibility of the system collapsing... that becomes an empirical matter. But I don't see that there is anything about our meta-understanding of morality which would necessarily imperil our moral practice if it were debunked. I'm trying not to just re-state my position, so let me highlight my objection: Although I think it's possible that moral practices will change (for the worse, from

Hi Jay,
I worked on a reply to your last post on the other thread, but wasn't satisfied with it. Was going to return and try to do better, but got distracted until I thought maybe it was too late to go back, but if you're still interested, I'll try to return to that as well. Looking back at what I was saying, I think you are taking me to mean something I didn't mean (though which, suitably qualified, I would also accept). You take me to be talking about the practical consequences of our accepting a debunking explanation of our moral views, but what I was saying was entirely at the theoretical level. I'm saying that, to be justified in accepting a debunking explanation of morality, we must have reason to believe that a realist view of morality must be rejected. Yet, I do not think appeals to evolution provide such a reason -- I'm saying that those who attempt to provide an evolutionary theory of morality are leaping to an implicitly debunking view of morality without having eliminated realist alternatives.
Let me expand a bit on that point. The evolutionary theorist may explain, for instance, why we have

Bloggin, I think I see what you mean now. I guess then I would draw a distinction between our moral inquiry about what to do (or even the questions, for example, about say, avoiding cruelty to animals, since words like "cruelty" can have a descriptive content) and our moral inquiry about the realism of morality. This doesn't have to be a hard distinction or a dichotomy, since the areas will effect one another. In any case, I agree that in order to accept what we both see as a debunking explanation, (if the evolutionary, naturalistic account is thought to be a complete explanation), it means that we reject alternative explanations. There may be just a bit of a methodological concern for me here still... I have in mind using God as an explanation. It isn't that atheists have to 1st reject God, then go about looking for scientific explanations of the world, it's that the God hypothesis can be set aside while scientific methods are applied. If scientific methods end up explaining everything we need (and indeed, everything the existence of God used to explain) then there's no longer a need for God as an explanation. Of course there's the

Bloggin, I replied to what I now understand to be your main point, but since we seem to have a legit disagreement about this too, I just wanted to add to this line of thought. In order to keep things as tidy as possible, however, I'm just making a new post which may create a new sub-thread. You have said that moral nihilism is a prima facie consequence of moral anit-realism. I want to say that moral anti-realists can give no argument against moral nihilism, which is probably stating the obvious, except that people sometimes seem to be unaware of this. Since we're commenting on a diavlog with Will Wilkinson, I want to point to something he said in the Atlantic Monthly blog comment section (Ross Douthat's section, particularly). A poster accused Will of all sorts of things, and complained that Will thinks that the Catholic Natural Law that Ross adheres to is silly. Will responded in the affirmative by saying that Catholic Natural Law is false in a way intellectually mature people can easily grasp, because man has no telos: http://rossdouthat.theatlantic.com/a...omment-2379771 Leaving aside how anyone can conclude that a standard of intellectual maturity includes

I may have left it too late to respond to your first post today, but I think I can say a few things about this one quickly. First, I agree with you that it is inconsistent for debunkers of morality to suggest that they are themselves morally superior to those who are "too cowardly" or too unconcerned about the value of truth to accept the debunking -- at least it is inconsistent of them to take this seriously (as opposed to merely trying to manipulate their opponents into agreeing with them by means of emotive language. Will's remark seems to skate very close to inconsistency as well. Maturity is the state that immature people are aiming at achieving when they grow up. If you miss the mark, remaining immature all the way until death, you've missed a mark that by your nature you aim at, not just one among any number of possible subjective goals. I sympathize with Will's rejection of "man's telos" on two grounds:
1. I agree with him that human beings were not planned or created organisms. If having a telos is assumed to involve having been created for

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

I think I see what you mean now. I guess then I would draw a distinction between our moral inquiry about what to do (or even the questions, for example, about say, avoiding cruelty to animals, since words like "cruelty" can have a descriptive content) and our moral inquiry about the realism of morality. This doesn't have to be a hard distinction or a dichotomy, since the areas will effect one another.

I don't deny that there is a distinction between a question like "Is slavery just" and a question like, "Is there an objective fact of the matter whether slavery is just or not?" What I deny is that our inquiry into the first question can proceed blissfully along, no matter what conclusions we come to on the first question. For example, if you started out believing in linguistic objectivism, and you then become convinced of conventionalism about language, you're going to stop trying to design studies to determine whether "dog" captures the nature of dogs better than "chien" or "Hund". And if you really take the conventional nature of language to heart, you'll probably recognize that there's nothing wrong with people who say "ain't" -- they are simply

Hey Bloggin, I don't think scientific standards have to be normative (at least not in a moral sense). It seems to me that something like parsimony could be described as "the simplest explanation," rather than "the simplest explanation is preferred." Of course once a notion preference is included, then it becomes normative, or value laden. But even "the simplest explanation is preferred" could be said like, "the simplest explanation tends to give explanations which seem connected to reality more so than complicated theories." We could even add "for whatever it's worth" at the end of such a definition. So I think epistemic standards can be purely descriptive. Even if by definition epistemic standards are conventional, nevertheless there seems to be a way of saying which standards lead us closer to an understanding of the world. Epistemic standards become normative (or value laden) when someone scowls at someone else for not accepting those standards, and there seems to be no epistemic justification for that practice (also I understand that while we're doing science, normative questions may come up, like what kind of explanation we're looking for, but that seems to be another topic). Now when

Quoting Jay J: Hey Bloggin,

I don't think scientific standards have to be normative (at least not in a moral sense). It seems to me that something like parsimony could be described as "the simplest explanation," rather than "the simplest explanation is preferred." Of course once a notion preference is included, then it becomes normative, or value laden. But even "the simplest explanation is preferred" could be said like, "the simplest explanation tends to give explanations which seem connected to reality more so than complicated theories." We could even add "for whatever it's worth" at the end of such a definition.You can descriptively paraphrase moral norms in the same way, but in both cases something is left out. Your "is preferred" paraphrase is not normative if it is only saying that some particular group tends to prefer one sort of explanation over another (the description of a preference is not normative). The passive construction is a bit suspicious -- I wonder if you are trying to straddle the descriptive "is preferred" and the normative "is to be preferred". The thing that is left out of your attempted paraphrases, of course, is the question "should I believe

Reply continued:

But you did say something that I disagree with: I don't think supernatural explanations can be said to fail any competition. I think they're merely "extra" and not as powerful as "intra" explanations. We need a reason to believe in "extra" things, things we have no day-to-day commerce with.

Supernatural explanations are not automatically preserved from scientific refutation, nor are they necessarily presented in a non-scientific spirit. William Paley's argument for design is a scientific, empirical argument which was very scientifically persuasive and plausible before Darwin, though it invoked supernatural entities. It's certainly true that supernatural hypotheses CAN be formulated (and reformulated and reformulated) to be consistent with currently known empirical evidence. But supernatural explanations are not just by their very nature part of a totally different project than the scientific one. I think it's pretty clear that supernatural explanations were (before the success of science) proposed as explanations of the phenomena. And, although supernatural explanations appear not to be necessary in the acutal world, it's not hard to imagine a world in which scientists really needed to invoke supernatural explanations to account for the phenomena. Unfortunately, I think Stephen Jay Gould's "non-overlapping magisteria" view is well-intentioned bunk

Bloggin, I agree that supernatural explanations are not preserved *automatically* from scientific refutation. We also agree that supernatural explanations can be made consistent with current scientific discovery. But I think it's unfair to imply that repetitious reformulation is the only way for supernatural explanation to be consistent with modern science. In Islam there was Sufism, in Buddhism, Zen, in Christianity, Paul Tillich, In Hinduism, Advaita Vedanta, in Judaism, Martin Buber. Some of these references are focused on how to live, and in this way could be described as local, but their advice is supported by a world view which doesn't seem contradictory with science at all, even though I would assert that they're separate from science. But others, such as parts of Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, make big picture metaphysical claims which don't seem to involve fixing your cancer. Now what I said was that supernatural explanation has *also* been concerned with ultimate explanations, rather than just local ones. So it's not that I deny the type of reasoning you're pointing out. I'm only saying that there exists line of thought which can be properly called "supernatural" which are concerned with ultimate explanation, and don't get into saying this or that about

Hi Jay,
Just a quick note: Spinoza spoke of "Deus sive Natura" -- God and/or Nature. God, for S, (if I remember my long-ago Freshman class on the rationalists properly) is the one substance contemplated under the attribute of thought, and nature is that same substance contemplated under the attribute of extension. Spinoza's God was definitely intended NOT to be supernatural, but rather just another way of looking at (the thing we call) nature. And that's an important part of what I like about Spinoza's God. Ultimately, I'm not unsympathetic to a sort of attempt to naturalize religion (without "demystifying" it) -- or to a recognition that some of what religion is getting at remains even after you pry off all the magical thinking that originally formed a part of it. I do feel that that project is a good deal more speculative than moral realism. For one thing, I don't think moral realism is an untestable "ultimate" add on to scientific theory. I think moral realism is at least in principle testable. Friday, if I get the chance, I'll try to give you a positive account (or rather a rough sketch) of what moral norms might be like, so that we have a better

Hi Bloggin, Scratch what I said about Spinoza. I shouldn't have added him. And I would be enthusiastic about hearing your proposal about moral realism. I should say where I stand on such matters though, so you know how ambitious to be in your explanation. I'm not a Platonist, and I don't believe scientific laws are a legitimate part of the scientific canon, unless they're understood very modestly and provisionally. On naturalizing religion without demystifying it, I guess I can see a difference between a system which posits a sort of dualism between the natural world and some supernatural realm on the one hand and a system which talks as if certain... extra reductive features are nevertheless a part of the natural world, on the other hand. But there seems to be nothing in the definition of "supernatural" that demarcates something obviously supernatural like the God of the Bible from some of the more monistic forms of Eastern thought, which state explicitly that everything is a part of the natural. When many people use the word supernatural, they're referring to belief systems which explicitly place a god over and apart from the natural world. So I realize

Bloggin, I'm not sure how to proceed. We've both expressed our view on norms, so I suppose we're at an impasse. Let me give it one more shot: See I just don't think there's any reason to think that "oughts" within our practices could be debunked. It's the 'outside the project' oughts that are at risk. To paraphrase a philosopher, Federer wants to beat Nadal.
The one and only way to beat Nadal is for Federer to serve hard.
Therefore, Federer ought to serve hard. But this isn't really a moral ought in my book, since what it displays is a logical relationship of a hypothetical imperative, it could be re-written like: IF Federer wants to beat Nadal,
AND the one and only way to beat Nadal is for Federer to serve hard,
THEN Federer ought to serve hard. The re-expression includes all the essential features of the first chain of reasoning. In both expressions of the chain of reasoning, we can see that all Federer has to do is stop caring about whether or not to beat Nadal to make the "ought" impotent. This may seem obvious, but there are consequences: Mother wants to keep her children healthy.
The one and

Bloggin, I agree with you completely on traditional Roman Catholic views of homosexuality. But I want to add that notions of psychic health are in just as much need as any moral concept of a meta-explanation, if in fact we are asserting that the world contains states which are healthy versus unhealthy, as opposed to states of the world we have chosen to declare (by fiat) desirable or undesirable. In other words, I don't believe any robust philosophical sense can be made of the notion of an immune system functioning properly, without any sense of telos whatsoever. I'm not suggesting medical practice will not function the way we want it to if we don't contrive a teleological story, I'm only saying that the belief that 'healthy' or 'unhealthy' are states of the world needs a belief in teleology in order to be consistent. And to clarify further, I'm not making a postmodern point about there being no fact of the physical matter to be derived from objective analysis, rather, I'm saying the evaluative word "healthy" is an endorsement of a state of the world which reflects only our attitudes, if in fact we have no notion of teleology.

Quoting Jay J:
In other words, I don't believe any robust philosophical sense can be made of the notion of an immune system functioning properly, without any sense of telos whatsoever.

I agree with you. My point is only that we can make sense of teleology without the extravagant metaphysical commitments that Will may have in mind, and to suggest that if he wants to reject teleology across the board, then he will be in the awkward position of rejecting, not only moral facts, but any claims about health (or intellectual maturity), unless he gives them an emotivist or conventionalist gloss.

Jay J, interesting argument you make. I'll leave the philosophy stuff between you and Bloggin' but I take it you're a tennis fan? The real scenario is: Federer wants to beat Nadal. Federer must play him on grass/hard-court. And: Nadal wants to beat Federer. Nadal must play him on clay. I'm bummed that Djokavic got knocked out early (it was going to be nice to see Federer actually challenged BEFORE the final for a change), but considering how well Nadal is playing now, and how close he came last year at Wimbledon, the grounds of my philosophical scenario may finally be changed this year.

Haven't had a chance to answer your comments today. Will reply at more length Monday (or maybe over the weekend if I get the chance).
You are here assuming that the moral realist is committed to Kant's categorical imperative. Although I've got very Kantian intuitions myself, I don't think all (objectivist) moral realists are by any means committed to the view that moral requirements are in no way based on desire.
Back later to fill that in. Have a nice weekend!

Bloggin, What I'm saying is that I believe the evaluative questions you point to in science are like hypothetical imperatives, and I don't see how any such line of thought would be debunked. The evaluation seems like a question of how to best move forward. So efficacy, rather than goodness, per se, is what is at question. As for Kant, I'm not assuming that moral realists are Kantian, I'm only asserting that it is a very tall order to say why people who lack the appropriate desires are somehow wrong or worse off. If people who lack the appropriate desire are not wrong or worse off, then the position doesn't seem like moral realism. But I am looking forward to your view, and I'm in no rush, have a good weekend.

Hello Jay, At a minimum moral realism is the claim that some normative moral claims report facts (i.e., they make claims of a sort which can be either true or false, and some of them are actually true).
One reason for rejecting moral realism is that one believes that normative claims in general cannot be factual claims. The standard reason for thinking this is that 'you can't derive an "ought" from an "is".' It's said that people can assent to descriptive claims without having any particular desiderative attitude toward the claim, whereas you can't assent to an ought statement without having a particular desire, yet nothing about the facts can compel you to take up a certain desire. If I say "you ought to serve hard," (on this view), I 'm expressing my own desire that you serve hard.
Your "hypothetical imperatives" are themselves a serious challenge to this sort of view. First of all, they appear to be cases where an "ought" follows from an "is" (or rather a pair of is-es). Second, it seems quite possible that I could assent to the claim that Federer ought to serve hard (if he

Hi Bloggin, From the end of your post up, or backwards to forwards: When I say that showing how people aren't wrong or worse off is a tall order for moral realism, I admit that there is ambiguity in that statement. So that's my fault, but I just want to stress that the word "wrong" doesn't have to only be read as "bad." I used two different terms ("wrong" or "worse off") to try and show that I think moral realism has the responsibility of explaining why someone is a) objectively mistaken and/or b) qualitatively worse off, if they eschew (in their lifestyle or in the intellectual set of beliefs) moral principles. But we can set "b" aside for now. If there are objectively true moral principles, then there is the issue of whether or not someone can recognize them, but there is also the issue of whether or not someone feels motivated by them. If one cannot recognize them without being motivated by them, then there's got to be a pretty interesting explanation for why that is the case. So even if someone can see certain features of the world, why would they be objectively wrong about

Hi Uncle, I'm not a huge tennis fan. I like to play more than watch. I did watch Wimbledon as a kid as it was always in the summer. I liked watching Conners, Johnny Mac, Chris Everett, etc. For some reason I could never get too much into Samprus-Agassi or the Williams sisters too much. And also for some reason Nadal-Federer has piqued my interest more so than any match up since I was a kid... One of my favorite movies is The Squid and the Whale, which has a tennis theme running through it.

Quoting Jay J:
If there are objectively true moral principles, then there is the issue of whether or not someone can recognize them, but there is also the issue of whether or not someone feels motivated by them. If one cannot recognize them without being motivated by them, then there's got to be a pretty interesting explanation for why that is the case.

Most moral realists would reject the claim that one cannot recognize moral truths without being motivated by them. Even a rationalist like me who claims that moral norms are some kind of rational norm, would point out that one can see that one has a reason to do something and yet fail to be motivated. For example, if Federer wants to beat Nadal, he has reason to practice, yet it seems quite possible for Federer to recognize this and yet be too depressed or weak of will to get out there and practice.

So even if someone can see certain features of the world, why would they be objectively wrong about failing to be morally motivated by these features of the world? This question

And I generally don't think the concept of "rational" obligation helps any either. I mean, it's almost tautologous to say that whatever a person does is in their interests, even committing suicide. If we have a notion of self-interest more robust than that, it seems that we're smuggling it in.

It is not at all tautologous to say that people always act in their own self-interest. If a soldier gives his life for his buddies, he's acting in their interest, not in his own. There is a fallacious argument that everything anyone does is self-interested that we can go into if you like, but the claim is not only not tautologous, it's deeply implausible. I'm not sure what you mean about "smuggling something in". If we regognize that people ever ought (rationally) to do anything rather than anything else (as your own hypothetical imperatives imply), then we can't just reject moral norms on the grounds that they are normative.
In any case, the notion that there are prudential norms of at least some minimal sort is nowhere near as controversial as an account of moral norms as some form of rational

Bloggin, If we're talking about ethics in philosophical discourse, then the word normative must have something to do with morality. We could talk about 'normative' in terms of our rational "norms" but here the word normative seems synonymous with the word "conventional." If the oughts aren't moral at all, then there seems to be no interesting way in which these oughts relate to the topic of moral discourse. Foot titled her essay "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives." In her essay, she gave us what is in my book a beautiful collection of words when she said, "We are volunteers, not conscripts, in the army of virtue." This is a rich and inspiring statement to me because it either just sets meta-ethical problems on the shelf and/or lets the individual search out more global explanations on their own. This way people of varying perspectives could come together and share a collective starting point, while possibly differing on individual starting points. I suppose I find her comment inspiring too because it fits with what I personally think, believe, or what have you, which is that there are moral facts, but that they aren't forceful

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

If we're talking about ethics in philosophical discourse, then the word normative must have something to do with morality. We could talk about 'normative' in terms of our rational "norms" but here the word normative seems synonymous with the word "conventional."

I disagree. I think that my use of "normative" as opposed to "descriptive" is the standard usage in Philosophical discussions of ethics. Descriptive statements are those that tell us how things are, and normative statements are those that tell us how they ought to be (or that compare reality with how things ought to be or ought to be done). Moral claims are a species of the normative genus -- moral claims are normative, but many normative claims are not moral. Here's Wikipedia
Of course, it doesn't matter much whether we define our terms as other philosophers do --except that we can run the risk of confusion. But can I suggest that we proceed with my definition, since I think we both grasp the distinction between "is" and "ought". I am not at all certain I grasp your conception of the normative/descriptive distinction. Would it be possible to formulate your arguments using my definition of the

Bloggin, I'm not arguing over standard usage only, I'm saying that when we crack the nut of hypothetical imperatives open, we find that there are ways that they could be understood which aren't normative. Are you denying that? I mean, when someone asks directions, we can say that the way for them to go is under the I-30 bridge, down main street past 3 stop lights, and ending at 3rd and Main. We can even imagine the person giving directions saying something like, "If you're trying to get to 3rd and Main, then you ought to go under the I-30 bridge, etc." The argument that this is normative simply because of the existence of the word ought strikes me as hyper-technical and unilluminating. Just to try to say it another way again; we can imagine hypothetical imperatives being purely information giving. If Federer wants to beat Nadal, then saying that Federer ought to serve hard is information giving, but not necessarily prescription giving. When you talk about advice as if it must be prescriptive, I can imagine the word advice being properly used in contexts where the advice was simply giving the person who asked information. I don't

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

I'm not arguing over standard usage only, I'm saying that when we crack the nut of hypothetical imperatives open, we find that there are ways that they could be understood which aren't normative.

Are you denying that?

Yes -- given that I regard "ought" statements as normative by definition. The challenge for you would be to explain what you mean by normative, if you don't regard all 'ought' statements as normative.

The argument that this is normative simply because of the existence of the word ought strikes me as hyper-technical and unilluminating.

Here you are presupposing that I am using some other notion of "normative" than I actually am using, or that I must really be trying to make some other distinction than I am making. My distinction between the normative and the purely descriptive, is between statements about how something ought to be (or ought to be done) and how things are. You seem to want to identify the "normative" with something more like a categorical imperative [OK, I see from further down that you deny this -- but please read on since, I think what I say is still relevant.] But the definition of a categorical imperative depends on the notion of an "imperative", doesn't it? Kant, in speaking of ought statements as "imperatives" is attempting to make the

Here's a snippet that I had to take out of the above reply to make it fit.

What I mean by teleology is that there is some sense in which nature is aiming at something, even if this aiming is at rather everyday (or mundane) states of the world; there need be no "supernatural" or divine realm separate from the natural world. On the other hand, I think it's true that a strict interpretation of Darwinism yields nothing in the way of teleology, so the moral theorist should make clear that they're going beyond Darwinian evolution, and in what sense they're going beyond; are they only suggesting an arbitrary starting point, or are the saying that Darwinism doesn't capture a key feature of the world, (namely, teleology) etc?

Thanks for the explanation -- that helps. I'd say there's a big difference between "Nature [in general] aiming at something" and the more modest notion that MY nature aims at something. The notion that my body can "malfunction" in a number of ways, or that the various organs can work together properly, or that the function of the heart is to pump blood -- can be maintained without a belief that

Hi again Bloggin, I take it then that you don't find any distinction between descriptive and normative economics? I mean, even the information giving parts of economics are based on what people generally want to know. On the other hand welfare economics is more explicitly guided by value assumptions, while policy economists openly use values to guide those they're advising. Even at the most modest stage of economics, there's no dichotomy between the descriptive and normative parts, since the descriptive parts are guided by what society generally is desirable of being informed of. But there clearly is a significant enough distinction to name one "descriptive" and another "normative." It seems that what you're saying would collapse this distinction. See I can't imagine even one part of economics which isn't action-guiding. Nevertheless the parts which simply reveal what is presented as objective information are labeled "descriptive" and those parts which openly advise a course of action, or are openly aiming at meeting certain value ends, are labeled "normative." I'm saying that there is tension between the different ways we normally make the descriptive/normative distinction, and the case of how we categorize hypothetical

Hey Bloggin, I have some pretty specific views about this, but I'll have to get to them later, or another day. Talk to you soon. Jay

Quoting Jay J: Hi again Bloggin,

I take it then that you don't find any distinction between descriptive and normative economics? I mean, even the information giving parts of economics are based on what people generally want to know. On the other hand welfare economics is more explicitly guided by value assumptions, while policy economists openly use values to guide those they're advising. Even at the most modest stage of economics, there's no dichotomy between the descriptive and normative parts, since the descriptive parts are guided by what society generally is desirable of being informed of.

That's a bit complicated. Even "descriptive" economics employs the notion of "rationality" which I believe is pretty inescapably normative. (See _Economic Analysis, Morl Philosophy and Public Policy by Hausman and McPherson for a defense.) But let's remember first that my definition was about statements not disciplines. SEcond, the requirement is not that the statement be relevant to action (e.g., "there are sharks in the water"), but that the "direction" or "recommendation" must be part of the meaning of the statement. If descriptive economics consists of predictions like the following, then the statements that make it up would be descriptive: "If you raise the minimum

BN and JJ: For what it's worth, I am finding your conversation very enlightening and interesting. I hope you continue. Make that, I think you OUGHT to continue. Thanks!

Many thanks, Me&. It's definitely worth something to know that someone else is even reading this. Makes me feel less guilty that we're taking up so much "space" on the BloggingHeads comments section.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Many thanks, Me&. It's definitely worth something to know that someone else is even reading this. Makes me feel less guilty that we're taking up so much "space" on the BloggingHeads comments section.

You shouldn't feel guilty. While I am not following this one that closely, it's perfectly fine that you and Jay have an extended discussion on whatever appeals to your interests. Plus, the separation of various threads makes it trivial for anyone not interested not to have to sort through your posts to find others.

I want to start over a bit. First a rediscription of the "problem", then in a later post, an attempt at the solution. First, I want to distinguish two different perspectives on action: the external or "anthropological" perspective and the "internal" or "engaged" or "deliberative" perspective. The external perspective looks at what people do in fact do, looks for causal explanations of their actions and may attempt to predict what people will do. Though this perspective is "external", it's possible to take up this perspective with respect to yourself. For example, you might try to figure out why you got so angry at something someone said and decide that the person somehow called up a memory of a childhood conflict with your mother. You might try to predict when you will be finished with a certain assignment, and take into account your tendency to procrastinate. The internal perspective is the one that we adopt when trying to decide what to do. You have a choice to make and you deliberate about what to do. It may be that when you are finished with deliberating, you are ready to act. In that case, your conclusion might be

Bloggin, I appreciate your temperment, which seems tolerant of almost incessant clarification, because I need some more... As for moving on, I want to begrudgingly (as there are several quibble's I have with the interpretation of what I'm saying) agree to do that, for the time being. However I'm still not entirely clear on what we're agreeing on as we move forward. It's not that I'm arguing with the usefulness of the definition (we'll that on the back-burner for now) it's that I'm not sure what foundation we're building on moving forward. As I see it, there are several relevant categories we've been landing in, which may be different in kind, not only degree: 1) Neutral information, like what the average temperature is on Mars. 2) Inherently useful information, like on maps. 2) Intrinsically action-guiding statements, like "If you want X, then you ought to do Y," even if the advisor really doesn't care if the advice is followed. 3) Intrinsically moral statements like, "If you fail to be moral, then you will fail to live up to your telos." So you're saying that a statement is action-guiding, not the information, right? See I thought perhaps the information could be action-guiding like the information on a map... a map is

Me&theboys, To quote Eli Cash (Owen Wilson) near the end of The Royal Tenenbaums, "How sweet of you to say." It's edifying to have someone as informed and sharp as Bloggin to discuss these things with, but I imagined that it was only my quirky interest (and perhaps Bloggin's) that was piqued.

As I see it, there are several relevant categories we've been landing in, which may be different in kind, not only degree:

1) Neutral information, like what the average temperature is on Mars.

2) Inherently useful information, like on maps.

3) Intrinsically action-guiding statements, like "If you want X, then you ought to do Y," even if the advisor really doesn't care if the advice is followed.

4) Intrinsically moral statements like, "If you fail to be moral, then you will fail to live up to your telos."

First, I don't see too much difference between 1 and 2 -- a map of Mars need not be "inherently" more useful or action guiding than knowledge of the average temperature of Mars. If I'm designing a Mars probe, I may need the information about the temperature of Mars much more than I need a map of my home town.
Second, a map -- one without arrows -- is a very good example of what I don't have in mind as "intrinsically action-guiding. A map is certainly useful and intended to be useful, but it doesn't tell you whether to go from home to the store or the store to home or whether to take the quickest or the most

Bloggin, If you're going to lay out the rest of your moral view over on the "fresh start" thread, then we can pursue clarification on this thread... that'll work right? See I was under the impression that to Kant, even the hypothetical imperative was a command of reason. True enough, it applies only to those who have the applicable desire, but if you have the applicable desire, then it really is forceful on you, right? But why I can't I just say, "I want to get to work in the next 30 minutes, but I want to take the 45 minute route." What's wrong with that? If the answer is that nothing is wrong with that, and the imperative is only a helpful, content-less guide for people to be efficient, that that's all fine and good. But I was under the impression that the hypothetical imperative involved more than that, namely that those people who have the applicable desire are under some sort of obligation placed on them by reason. Um, what I've said above applies to the middle-ish part of your last post, so let me get to what you said at the end now. To hone in on what I mean by

Jay,
My apologies for not coming back recently -- I've been busy.

Quoting Jay J:

See I was under the impression that to Kant, even the hypothetical imperative was a command of reason.

This statement is phrased as though you were saying something different from what I said, yet (if you drop "of reason") it is pretty much exactly what I was saying (or trying to say). The "of reason" bit starts to mix a description of the symptoms (or the agreed upon facts) and the diagnosis (an account of the explanation of those facts).
The agreed upon facts, I take it, are that statements like "there are sharks in the water", though they may be USED to direct people, do not intrinsically direct people toward or away from the water (not as a part of their meaning). Claims like "you ought to stay out of the water" DO direct the listener one way rather than another as part of their meaning. I've been calling the latter kind of claim "normative". You have objected to this, seeming to exempt "hypothetical imperatives" from the normative realm. My point is that, even if you don't like the use of the word "normative" to mark this

Hi Bloggin, On Kant, what I mean is that I was under the impression that even if one had no concern whatsoever about being rational, they were still under an obligation from reason (so this seems like an expression of a Kantian Archimedean Point). This was Kant's way of trying to make reason binding on each and every person, as far as I know. Now you can agree or disagree with this interpretation, but it doesn't sound at all to me like what you've said.

You seem to be adopting a position where you deny that there are any rational norms whatsoever. As far as I understand him, I don't think Williams would go anything like that far. I think he believes in rational norms.

Again, I simply had a different understanding of the word normative. If the word normative can include non-moral, action guiding norms, and if "rational norms" are like these (non-moral) then I'm not denying these kinds of norms. On Williams, I agree that he would accept non-moral action guiding norms, but he doesn't then believe this is sufficient to believe morality exists in any metaphysical sense at all. Putnam seems to think this doesn't matter... I'm with

Hi Jay,
I wrote most of a long post in response here and my browser quit on me. Let me see if I can say some of the same things only faster.

Quoting Jay J: Hi Bloggin,

On Kant, what I mean is that I was under the impression that even if one had no concern whatsoever about being rational, they were still under an obligation from reason (so this seems like an expression of a Kantian Archimedean Point). This was Kant's way of trying to make reason binding on each and every person, as far as I know. Now you can agree or disagree with this interpretation, but it doesn't sound at all to me like what you've said.

Are you saying that I need to have a self-conscious, and explicit desire "To be rational" or I won't have any reason to be rational? If I have certain ends, and I don't succeed in achieving them (or if I find their achievement entirely unsatisfying) because I am irrational, isn't that enough reason to be rational, whether or not I have a special desire to be rational?

The reason I kept pursuing the way I have, is that I remember the term "moral realism" being used early on. This may

Actually, I'm a Kant scholar, having written my dissertation on his theory of evil. I wish I'd noticed your thread earlier!

Bloggin, On Kant, my impression is that Kant's view of reason was his own stab at establishing an Archimedean Point. Which is to say that one is under obligation to be rational... your question about having a reason to be rational does not get at what I was saying. My impression of Kant is that the matter of reason was non-contingent to him. True enough a hypothetical imperative is binding only on those who had the desire, (and besides, I seem to remember Kant believing that there are things we *should* desire), but to act inconsistently based on those desires was to fail to meet your obligation. I may be wrong on the facts, but it's just not the case that I was saying anything about whether or not you could find a practical reason to be rational. And on this *particular* point, I'm not saying anything about whether you have a reason to be rational; I'm saying what I understand Kant to have said. On your argument against normative anti-realism, I take your point; you've sold me. It's mostly been a matter of definition. Whenever you're ready to move to the next step on the thread

Sorry to interrupt, but I just had to say that "Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy" may be the most euphonious phrase I've heard all week. And how about this, from a page selling the book of that title?

If philosophy has any business in the world, it is the clarification of our thinking and the clearing away of ideas that cloud the mind.

Probably eye-rollingly obvious to you two, but I liked it.

Which is to say that one is under obligation to be rational...

What kind of "obligation" are we talking about? A MORAL obligation? -- a "rational obligation"? If the former, it seems to me that Kant really puts it the other way around: we ought to be moral because we ought to be rational (and moral requirements are requirements of reason). If the latter, then it seems to me that even the believer in purely instrumental reason would agree with Kant that we are obliged (rationally) to be rational (i.e., that one ought rationally to be rational or that one has reason to be rationall). They will differ greatly on what reason requires, but they will agree that one ought rationally to do what reason requires.

Your figurative question about chess puzzles me, I would think that by the momentum of the argument, it is apparent that I'm not only talking about practical reasons for doing something, but non-contingent reasons, which rely on an Archimedean Point.

First of all, if we can, we should be careful about the use of the term "practical reason". In philosophical parlance 'practical reason' is opposed to 'theoretical reason'. Theoretical reason governs our

Bloggin, First, I take your point about terminology... It's just that I tend to be a little looser with my language on forums like this, plus my command of philosophical jargon is still evolving. The word "instrumental" seems like a good word for what I have in mind. On Kant, I don't want to get too enthused, since the next post may reveal otherwise, but I think we're getting close to agreeing on what he meant. But I just don't understand how we can confidently say that "one ought rationally to do what reason requires." I mean, there seems to be a dangerous level of ambiguity in the word "ought," and if one person is meaning the ought merely instrumentally, and another is using the word non-contingently, then it's hard for me to say that they are communicating the same thing. And if a person was using the word "ought" merely instrumentally, I don't know what they could mean when saying that we're "obliged" to do anything. On Aristotle and reasons, I'm really not too hung up on timing, so the short answer to your question on this is "no," I'm not denying all ascriptions of reasons to people who would not

Actually, I'm a Kant scholar...

Bobby, that's a little intimidating. I'm a philosophy undergrad. My formal exposure to Kant is limited to Intro to Ethics and an upper-level Ethics Seminar, we really didn't cover him in my Intro to Philosophy class. But I'm taking Modern Philosophy in the Fall. Anyways, I feel comfortable with my ideas, but less so with my command of the jargon and the proper interpretation of historical figures. Feel free to chime in with your thoughts or expertise...

bjkeefe, I like that description of philosophy, and I want to add that I don't find it obvious at all. A popular picture, one that I started out with, is that philosophy consists of bold metaphysical speculation about the cosmos. An even cruder picture is one of trivial arguments or empty and flowery platitudes. My experience however has been closer to the description you cited. And that's good I think. I've come to see philosophy as an approach, rather than a set of ideas or any type of specific content. And on Putnam, I read that book, and I think the title is not at all the only sweet sentence the reader encounters. His next book had a more technical title, "Ethics without Ontology." Either way, Putnam has a way of saying allot with fewer words than most people need. He's probably influenced me more than any philosopher, even when I don't agree with him, he's still acting as a kind of flashlight for me.

Hello Jay, I think I'll try to carry on here rather than answering your other post right away, but I'll try to return to that. Coming back to this after so long, I naturally see some problems with it. First, I probably should have labeled my two viewpoints as the "standpoint of justification" and the "standpoint of description/explanation. Second, I shouldn't have made the distinction entirely in terms of action. You can try to explain a belief without reference to the belief's justification ("his parents taught him that"). You can say "people often accept arguments of the form:
All Vulcans have pointy ears.
Tom has pointy ears.
Therefore, Tom is a Vulcan."
But that in no way settles the question whether it is an inference that they OUGHT to make, whether the inference is justified or rational.
In other posts, I've made a sort of "grammatical" distinction between "is" and "ought" statements. I hope that what I said about these two different standpoints makes it clear that the distinction is substantive, even though my means of marking it up to now has been more formal.
I'd intended to carry on more gradually from here, but I've had less time, and have proved more distractable

Bloggin, I think it will be helpful for me to break my reaction into parts: 1) The meaning of the philosophical term "moral realism" will be decided perhaps in spite of what I want, but if I had my way, I would reserve the term for a theory which justified morality by some sort of metaphysical story. The cost of allowing the term to apply to theories which don't include the metaphysical justification, is that we may have nothing "true" to say about horrific events in other societies. A moral realism which can't mean what most people seem to mean when we say "Mao was a bad person" doesn't seem to be a form of realism. 2) In terms of your idea about whole societies and how they're designed, I think I'm an easy sell here, at least on the possibility of finding ways of designing societies which would lead to more prosperity, freedom, etc. All governments are not created equal. But other than still allowing what concerns me in #1, this still seems to rely on non-moral reasoning. Though I can agree that there is something it is socially rational to do, this too depends on the desires

Bloggin, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord has several interesting essays on his faculty page. I've already borrowed from one ("The Many Moral Realisms"). In "Moral Realism," Sayre-McCord says: "... among realists there is serious disagreement even about what sort of thing a moral fact is. Thus some realists hold that moral facts are just a kind of natural fact, while others hold they are nonnatural or even supernatural. Some realists hold that moral facts are discoverable by empirical enquiry, while others see rational intuition or divine inspiration as essential to moral knowledge. Moreover, some realists believe that while there genuinely are moral facts, those facts are themselves dependent upon, and a reflection of, human nature or social practice. They thus combine a commitment to moral facts with a relativist or a contractarian or constructivist account of those facts. Such views reject the idea that the moral facts exist independent of humans and their various capacities or practices. Yet, to the extent they are advanced as capturing accurately what the moral facts actually are, they are versions of moral realism. Needless to say, what one person might see as nicely accounting for the nature of moral

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord has several interesting essays on his faculty page. I've already borrowed from one ("The Many Moral Realisms").

In "Moral Realism," Sayre-McCord says:

"... among realists there is serious disagreement even about what sort of thing a moral fact is. Thus some realists hold that moral facts are just a kind of natural fact, while others hold they are nonnatural or even supernatural. Some realists hold that moral facts are discoverable by empirical enquiry, while others see rational intuition or divine inspiration as essential to moral knowledge. Moreover, some realists believe that while there genuinely are moral facts, those facts are themselves dependent upon, and a reflection of, human nature or social practice. They thus combine a commitment to moral facts with a relativist or a contractarian or constructivist account of those facts. Such views reject the idea that the moral facts exist independent of humans and their various capacities or practices. Yet, to the extent they are advanced as capturing accurately what the moral facts actually are, they are versions of moral realism. Needless to say, what one person might see as nicely accounting for the nature of moral

Hi Bloggin, I didn't mean to pidginhole your view, I just missed how some standard of justice is "plain better" than any other. I don't know how we could understand this aside from a particular point of view which had already decided which things to value. Which systems of justice produce more freedom, prosperity, equality, etc, seems to be a matter of plain fact, but the degree to which a society values these will determine which system is plain better, I don't know how to understand the word "better" aside from this.

A quick reply in connection with your 5th point, let me say that I DON'T see my aim as a moral realist as putting moral claims on a firm foundation (of reason). I don't take claims of reason or claims of morality to be any more "foundational" than the other. I think morality claims to be giving us reasons. Many theories of practical reason are hard to square with that claim.
My question is: "how can our view of morality on the one hand and our theory of practical reason on the other be fitted for one another?"
I don't start with a theory of practical reason which I assume to be established and certain and then try to "justify" a shakier morality on the bais of this. I think we ought, in forming our theory of practical reason, to take account of the fact that we (most of us) feel we have reason to be moral, even though we feel being moral is not in our interest. I'm hopeful that some of your other worries will be answered when I say more about what I mean by the "social viewpoint". I definitely don't mean "the viewpoint

Bloggin, May I simply replace the word metaphysical with the word "cosmological?" I think I was using a sense of the word metaphysical, but I think your question makes sense, so by changing words hopefully it will become clearer what I mean. I think when Mackie said that moral facts must be metaphysically queer, he discussed... Platonic Forms as an example, I believe. I suppose some of what drives me here is that from our discussion, I am clear on what can count as a normative fact, but not what can count as a moral one. That people use words certain ways, or have certain practices, does not strike me as moral, but rather grammatical or conventional. Anyway, maybe the word 'cosmological' is a better one for what I'm getting at.

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

May I simply replace the word metaphysical with the word "cosmological?"

I think I was using a sense of the word metaphysical, but I think your question makes sense, so by changing words hopefully it will become clearer what I mean.

I think when Mackie said that moral facts must be metaphysically queer, he discussed... Platonic Forms as an example, I believe.

Changing it to "cosmological" does nothing for me. Your mention of Mackie's "queerness argument" is much more helpful. Apparently, you believe that Mackie is right:
1. Moral judgments "claim" to state objective facts which are at the same time "prescriptive" ("normative" in the sense I've been using of "intrinsically action-guiding" or "intrinsically 'directional'").
2. So a (full-fledged) moral realist must believe in "objective prescriptivity".
3. But objectively prescriptive facts would be "metaphysically queer" -- (i.e., inconsistent with a naturalistic view of the world). Mackie would continue the argument with something like this:
4. At this stage of intellectual history, it is irrational to believe in facts that are inconsistent with a naturalistic world view.
5. Therefore, we ought to reject (full-fledged) moral realism. You take a slightly softer line at this point:
4. There is (and will be) no evidence for the existence of facts that don't fit within a naturalistic world-view, but faith in

Hi Bloggin, On faith, I certainly think that if someone walks around with a robust feeling of right and wrong, and goes around applying it in their arguments, then I think their world-view would be made more consistent by adopting faith in some metaphysical or cosmological story. Whether consistency or epistemological modesty is more important to being "rational," I don't know. As for the term "cosmological" I don't really know what you mean when you say that it does nothing for you. I'm simply trying to explain my view, so what can I say? When I cite Mackie's argument from metaphysical queerness and you tell me that you consider the question "Are there any grammatical facts, and if so what kind of facts are they?" to be a metaphysical question, then I'm not comfortable in settling on the word. As for building queerness into morality, I'm not sure what this means either. I have thought for a long time about what people mean when they say "Chairman Mao was a bad person." Of course this doesn't mean that I'm right simply because I've thought about it, it just means that it seems to me that we

Quoting Jay J:
As for the term "cosmological" I don't really know what you mean when you say that it does nothing for you. I'm simply trying to explain my view, so what can I say?

I'm saying that no single word all by itself -- especially one as broad as "cosmological" or "metaphysical" -- will help much in explaining or clarifying your view to someone who doesn't already know precisely what you mean. Based upon a previous post of yours, I take it that you mean by a "cosmological story", a view according to which the universe itself has a point of view on human action or a purpose which human action can either promote or frustrate. Is that correct? You think it would be inconsistent for someone to say both (a) the universe itself may have no purpose and no point of view on human action and (b) there are moral facts, and among these facts is the fact that Hitler and Chairman Mao were bad people? The view that the universe itself has a purpose or a point of view (and that this point of view is somehow binding on

Bloggin, I clearly acknowledged the fact that my thinking allot about it doesn't make me right, so there's no need for you to worry that I'm using my thought as a trump card. I know it's not. But I think the fact that many people search for a robust metaphysical or cosmological story to justify morality at least shows that many people have the same intuition that I do about what moral claims aim for. Many religious believers say that there is no way to understand morality outside of their faith tradition. This doesn't mean they're right, but they at least deserve a category! Also some secular types end up being moral skeptics because of the lack of a universal perspective. It just doesn't strike me as too ambitious to say that there is at least a sense in which morality makes truth claims that go beyond desire-dependent action guidance, cultural rules, thick ethical concepts, etc. If you don't share this intuition at all, and demand tangible evidence, then I think we're at an impasse. As for the word cosmological, I think we're getting close to being on the same page. The story about

Hi Jay,
All right, so the intuition we start from is that if there are moral facts, they must be "universal" and the conclusion is that moral realism is inconsistent with a naturalistic world-view.
"Universality" is naturally interpreted as a point about the "scope" of moral principles -- the set of beings we regard moral principles and moral properties as potentially applying to.
1) The scope of moral principles is not limited to those who care about being moral -- i.e., "but I like killing people" is not a moral excuse -- just as "but I like to move my pawns 5 spaces sideways" does not justify such a move in a game of chess. This is the sense of "universality" (or "inescapability") that Philippa Foot points out applies to etiquette and morality both: the rule that you answer a third person invitation in the third person does not contain an exception for those who don't care about it -- the rule applies even to those who don't care about it and even to those who have no reason whatsoever to care about it.
The rules of etiquette may apply to all members of

Hi Bloggin, I'll try to be brief... It is my view that societal rules are just fine, rational even. But if there is a possible area where normativity and morality don't overlap, then I think we have to be careful not to think that we have established realism in morality simply because we have established reason in normativity. In other words, there may be a fact of the matter about flipping someone the bird, but that just gives us "thickness" in the sense that there is a fact of the matter about whether or not someone is brave, cruel, rude, etc. But "thinness," right, wrong, bad, good, requires another step of explanation, in my opinion and in the opinion of many others. As for medical knowledge, presumably a disagreement between doctors publishing in the New England Journal of Medicine and witch doctors from the Australian outback would be settled by referring to objective physiological facts. How our knowledge of objective facts of any kind could explain (in a non-debunking way) our belief that we are evaluating something independent of conventions or morally neutral instrumentality is beyond me. But for now I'm happy to just have

Hi Jay,
This post attempts to do what the previous post promised -- with no pretense of answering anything in your subsequent post. Suppose you have a group of people, each one of whom is concerned to live as happy a life as possible. What strategy would you recommend to the whole group? Would you recommend that in making each decision, each person focus single-mindedly on his own interest to the exclusion of everyone else’s interest? That initially sounds like an obvious answer, but if you think a little further, it turns out to be a rotten strategy – at least if these people need to interact or to compete for resources. This is clear from a case like the Prisoners’ Dilemma. I’m sure you know about it, but I’ll present it briefly here in the name of completeness: The DA knows that one of two prisoners has committed a serious crime, but he can only prove a much lesser crime without a confession. He therefore offers each prisoner a deal: rat out the other guy, and if he doesn’t also turn you in, you’ll get 6 months and he’ll get 10 years. If neither

Bloggin,

Suppose you have a group of people, each one of whom is concerned to live as happy a life as possible. What strategy would you recommend to the whole group?

I'm not sure why this is all that important a question for the issue of moral realism vs. moral skepticism. I may recommend one thing to the group, and another thing to ambitious individuals for a fee (we can't assume morality up front, we have to demonstrate it, which is why I'm talking in this amoral way). After discussing the Prisoner's Dilemma, you say:

In this case (and in many similar cases), a strategy of unlimited pursuit of self-interest will be collectively inferior to a less single-mindedly self-interested strategy.

I agree, but I don't find collectivity to be the most important issue. Also I'm not willing to discount the workability of societies who extend the rules only to certain powerful groups. Then you ask:

...if you have a group of people, each of whom is concerned to live as happy a life as possible, what set of rules for society as a whole would they all have reason to accept?

What do we

To wrap up, I presume that any evidence I muster about people who think similarly to me about what's required of moral realism will not be new to you, so let me try this: To take the example of rape a little further, let's say there is a man and woman who are descended from an un-contacted tribe in the Australian Outback. An earthquake has just wiped out everyone else in their tribe. They're wandering around, distraught. They aren't a part of our soceity, and their society is gone. The man thinks to himself, "I think I'll rape her. Yea I've always thought she was hot, and she's never liked me, and I'm mad at her for rejecting me. The stupid tribal chiefs wouldn't have tolerated me forcing myself on her, and as long as they were around, it was to my advantage to lay off. But now, who knows if we'll even survive, and I would like to have the pleasure of raping her before I die. The reason I'm raping her is not to continue our tribe, but just to get pleasure for myself. And after I rape her, I think I'll tie her up and taunt her about

Bloggin, I just want to add something. I'm not sure if it's obvious or not, so I'll just say it... I feel confident that you've accomplished everything you set out to in your argument. The problem is that we set out to accomplish different goals, even though we're presumably both talking about moral realism. I have little doubt about how you would personally appraise the scenario I described to you if it was a true news report. I'm simply trying to get at what you feel is justified by your moral theory. I would be interested in hearing what you have to say, but first I suppose we would have to agree that we could gerrymander our hypotheticals such that we can come up with situations which fall outside the scope of a moral theory like Gauthier's, and that such situations have probably happened in human history. Then, (and here's the key agreement we would need to come to), we need to agree that morality is used to aim at successfully describing even these situations, like the hypothetical I offered.

But if I accept the rules of hopscotch for the sake of playing the game, does this make me a hopscotch realist? I'm really not trying to sound flippant, but I just don't know how else to put the issue on the table.

That is not the appropriate analogy for what I am imagining. We'd be closer if you imagined:
1) That we are playing a hopping game, and that we deduce the rules of hopscotch from the mere fact that the game is a hopping game
and
2) That to give up on the hopping game entirely is to give up on the game of life. Here is my starting point:
A) Morality claims to be more than a merely conventional norm -- rather, it claims to be a norm or set of norms from which to judge conventional social norms.
B) Moral reasons are "public reasons" --I may have private reason to prefer norms that favor me arbitrarily over other people, but these don't count as public reasons because they are not reasons I could expect others who are different from me to accept as reasons
C) Moral reasons are impartial reasons -- they take the

Quoting Jay J: To wrap up, I presume that any evidence I muster about people who think similarly to me about what's required of moral realism will not be new to you, so let me try this:

To take the example of rape a little further, let's say there is a man and woman who are descended from an un-contacted tribe in the Australian Outback. An earthquake has just wiped out everyone else in their tribe. They're wandering around, distraught. They aren't a part of our soceity, and their society is gone. The man thinks to himself,

"I think I'll rape her. Yea I've always thought she was hot, and she's never liked me, and I'm mad at her for rejecting me. The stupid tribal chiefs wouldn't have tolerated me forcing myself on her, and as long as they were around, it was to my advantage to lay off. But now, who knows if we'll even survive, and I would like to have the pleasure of raping her before I die. The reason I'm raping her is not to continue our tribe, but just to get pleasure for myself. And after I rape her, I think I'll tie her up and taunt her about

Bloggin, I'm not sure if there's anything inconsistent or contradictory in your view as much as I view this as a non-sequitur:

But nothing in your description of the case seems to show that I wouldn't prefer (as surely anyone would) that others not brutally rape and torture me against my will. I conclude that it is indeed wrong for me to do such a thing.

Why does it follow simply because you wouldn't want it happening to you? And even if we could get to that conclusion, why would it follow that this guy in our hypothetical has a reason not to? And simply because you have reason to prefer that others act a certain way does not mean that all others have a reason to act that way. I'm not assuming that you've granted any "overriding reasons" requirement, I just fail to see how you could say the guy is wrong, if wrongness goes beyond your own attitude. And I don't see how your view explains how the guy in our hypothetical has *any* reason not to rape the woman.

Hi Bloggin,

...to give up on the hopping game entirely is to give up on the game of life.

Why? Some people get their kicks from breaking the rules of the game of life. And what's wrong with that other than, "Those guys don't live according to the rules we've set down," or "We have reason to prefer that they behaved differently."

Morality claims to be THE set of norms from which to judge social norms.

Why? How have we gained this authority? Why should people in societies which fall short according to THE set of norms care? And why does A-D apply to "rational" people? What's irrational about being amoral? I realize that society has developed incentives to behave in a civilized way, at least at times, but what is there like, a priori, or necessarily following by logic or empirical fact that says the amoralist isn't rational? Because societies would converge upon *some* rules with which to judge social norms doesn't mean these rules would lead to what you or I would call "moral" outcomes. We agree that morality sits apart from convention and critiques convention, but I just don't see how your view accomplishes this in a

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

I'm not sure if there's anything inconsistent or contradictory in your view as much as I view this as a non-sequitur:

Why does it follow simply because you wouldn't want it happening to you? And even if we could get to that conclusion, why would it follow that this guy in our hypothetical has a reason not to?

And simply because you have reason to prefer that others act a certain way does not mean that all others have a reason to act that way.

Jay, not much time right now, but it seems that either I was unclear or you read over what I said a bit too hastily. Could you read over what I said with this in mind:
I do not claim that the person to whom moral claims apply has reason to do as the moral claim directs. I explicitly put that aside (or I tried to put that aside explicitly). That said, I do think there is SOME connection between my reasons and the application of moral principles to me. But the connection is not the one that you and Kant insist upon -- reason to do as

Bloggin, What you said was:

But nothing in your description of the case seems to show that I wouldn't prefer (as surely anyone would) that others not brutally rape and torture me against my will. I conclude that it is indeed wrong for me to do such a thing.

And my response is this: Why use the word *wrong* here? It is not at all obvious that wrongness can be translated to having "...a reason to prefer a world in which this rule is universally obeyed over that system of norms implied by his own action, if that were universally obeyed." I grant that you don't have much time and that you said this may not be a sufficient definition, but what I am saying is that it is not at all obvious to me that this gets at what wrongness is. The thing is, you used the word wrong in the words I quoted you from. As for the evil man not having reason, what you've said a few times is that there may not be *overriding* reason, in which case I want to point out that there may be situations where

To take up your analogy, Chalmers at least does separate an "easy problem" of concsiousness which he thinks functionalism and computer science have begun to solve. I am trying to point out that there are two problems here as well, which can be separated to some degree:
A. Could moral norms be objective?
and
B. If I am facing an amoralist who is about to put me through a meat grinder or rape and strangle me, how can I persuade him (if he is rational) that he shouldn't do so. One note: In my posts, I am sometimes presenting what we believe and the consequences of what we believe without AT THAT POINT accepting that these beliefs are true. We won't be able to get anywhere if you always assume that I am taking commonsense beliefs as conclusive evidence as you do above. I say

Morality claims to be THE set of norms from which to judge social norms.

and you respond without noting the "claims":

Why? How have we gained this authority? Why should people in societies which fall short according to THE set of norms care?

Recall that the moral realist answers TWO questions:
1. what does morality claim for itself?
and
2. Are these claims literally

Bloggin, I'm already convinced that morality makes the kinds of claims you're saying they do (although I may think morality claims even more). What I don't see is how your view goes beyond that. It may be possible that my responses are meta ones and not *only* for the purpose of responding locally to each and every sentence. I realize that I cited the sentence in question, but it seems to me that there isn't only one way to look at my response, but you've chosen the interpretation which is the least flattering. We've been talking for quite some time, and I've yet to see anything which I think gets at moral realism. You're on to something, I just can't see how it's moral realism. I do take responsibility for having less the perfect precision in my response, so let me try to get closer to that target: In A-D that you outlined in your post in question, you talk about what moral realism requires in that it at least claims A-D. So when I question why others should care, I mean to say that whatever conclusions you come to to satisfy A-D, should be capable of satisfying

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

I'm already convinced that morality makes the kinds of claims you're saying they do (although I may think morality claims even more).

I wasn't trying to convince you that it made these claims, but rather to cite our agreement about these claims (at least) in a further discussion of what might count as a minimal form of moral realism. I'm trying to get you to accept that if A-D are ALL satisfied, that is a minimal form of moral realism. I don't actually offer an argument for that claim that they are all satisfied -- nor do I believe I've made any kind of air-tight case that they are anywhere in our discussion. Here I am just trying to get you to agree that if A-D are satisfied, then we have at least a significant PART of what you and I both mean by moral realism. I'm trying to set up the standards by which to judge an account, not to give an account in the above post. In a previous post, I tried to show why it wasn't just looney to suppose that such an account could ultimately be given.

To be more specific

Fair point about A-D. Let me just say then that I think D relies on something like I've been getting at. I don't believe D is simply asserted without any underlying (or even unconscious) belief in something which goes beyond what naturalism justifies. I agree with Mackie on what morality claims about reason giving for every person in every situation. If we lack that, then whatever rules we have deduced are less than "real" in the sense of realism. But I'm sure that disagreement is noted by now. I look forward to your next post.

Quoting Jay J: Fair point about A-D.

I agree with Mackie on what morality claims about reason giving for every person in every situation. If we lack that, then whatever rules we have deduced are less than "real" in the sense of realism.
.

Mackie's position is actually ludicrously strong -- even stronger than what you seem to require here. He says that the perception of a moral fact must not only give a person a reason, it must give him a motive -- and in fact an overriding motive to do the right thing. Do you follow Mackie in this? If not, then you yourself are willing to water Mackie down somewhat. Perhaps the watering ought to go just a bit further.
I don't sever all connection between morality and reasons for the individual by any means, but the connection is not so immediate as you seem to want.
The bottom line is that there is much disagreement about the precise connection required between morality and reason.
What exact connection between reason and morality do you require, and why is THAT the rational standard? Or rather, why is that the last ditch standard. Perhaps our pre-scientific inuitions

Hi Bloggin, I hope this isn't too hasty a post, but I want to get a couple of things out (I'm about to drive 5 hours and my posting my be sketchy over the next few days, but for my part, I would like to continue the conversation, even if the pace slows). I just want to say that it's impossible for me to imagine that people would fail to appraise my Australian Outback example as an example of wrongness (as you did). And by that I don't think they mean an example of what not to do in our society, I think they mean that the extreme cruelty I laid out is inherently wrong, no matter where or when it happens. Because of this, I presume that when they say something in our society is wrong, they mean it is inherently wrong in the same way, even if the degree of wrongness is less. Why this focus on inherent wrongness? Because we can be creative enough to think of examples of people completely outside our social conventions or language game, and some of those people may lack the same desires and motives as most

The idea I had last time that I mentioned in my last post was that we should focus on who "the enemy" is at each stage of the game.
Moral realism has a number of enemies with quite different concerns -- there are quite a variety of moral skeptics, and it's sufficient that the moral realist defeat them one at a time. Just as the strongest man in the room need only defend his title one by one, without claiming to take on the entire mob, so the strongest theory shouldn't have to face mutually inconsistent objections from all of its opponents at once. ("The food is lousy and I don't have the time to savor it.")
Suppose the moral realist is taking on the cultural relativist in the current bout. The cultural relativist claims that if we are going to judge the social norms of a culture, there is no standard from which to judge these norms that is any more grounded in reason than those social norms themselves. One thing that the cultural relativist will probably agree to is that the function of

Hi Jay,
Thanks for the warning that you may not be around for a while. If you haven't noticed it, let me draw your attention to my other post that attempted to take my new approach to the issue that I said I would take before I replied to your last post.

Quoting Jay J: I just want to say that it's impossible for me to imagine that people would fail to appraise my Australian Outback example as an example of wrongness (as you did).

Wait a minute! Are you saying that I said it was NOT an example of wrongness? The sentence is ambiguous, but the implication is that I said it was not a clear case of wrongness. I think it is a clear case, and I said it was. You didn't seem to think I had the right to say that, but that was because you were assuming something that I explicitly denied: If an action A is wrong for a person, P, then P must have a reason, which if he just understood it properly and which if he were rational would motivate him now not to do A.

And by that I don't think they mean an example of

Bloggin, I'm away from home, but it turns out that I have a few minutes this morning. So I want to say a couple of things: *I realize you said the man in my hypothetical is wrong. And I grant that every decent person would say the same. But upon relfection, we need to ask ourselves why he's wrong. Of course in our daily lives we will feel disgusted by stories such as these, but upon relfection in our armchairs, if we find that our world-view doesn't account for the actual wrongness of the action, then we SHOULD withdraw our judgment, even if we could never really do this in our daily lives. The reason we should withdraw our judgment is because we're trying to find what we're warranted in saying when we describe actual events. I know you told me that the man was wrong, but I haven't caught why... I haven't caught what about the situation can be said to be an example of wrongness. *I agree that there is an impartial point of view that tells us the pregnant woman needs the seat more. But I think it's a leap to say there's an impartial

Quoting Jay J: Bloggin,

I'm away from home, but it turns out that I have a few minutes this morning. So I want to say a couple of things:

*I realize you said the man in my hypothetical is wrong. And I grant that every decent person would say the same. But upon relfection, we need to ask ourselves why he's wrong.

Of course in our daily lives we will feel disgusted by stories such as these, but upon relfection in our armchairs, if we find that our world-view doesn't account for the actual wrongness of the action, then we SHOULD withdraw our judgment, even if we could never really do this in our daily lives.

If I haven't communicated clearly what I have in mind or if I haven't convinced you, that doesn't mean I'm being naive.

It does strike me that I may not have been clear enough about one thing. The approach I have in mind simply defines "morally ought" in terms of the impartial point of view. There are basically two ways to do this: the broadly utilitarian way and the broadly Kantian way. The utilitarian version might define what one morally ought to do as "what a person

Bloggin, Here's a key passage from a recent post of yours:

An appeal to an impartial point of view is not just an appeal to my own point of view. For example, if you have a seat on the train and a pregnant woman gets on, it's an inconvenience for you to stand, and if you don't give a damn about other people, you will keep your seat and, let us suppose you have. But let me ask you a question: who needs the seat more? It isn't just MY point of view that says the 9-months pregnant woman needs it more. Even a completely selfish person could recognize that it would be much worse to stand if standing for long periods makes you dizzy and sick and if your balance is thrown off etc., than if it's just a matter of your feet getting a bit tired. Even the totally selfish amoralist, on this view, can recognize that, from an impartial point of view, the pregnant woman ought to have a seat instead of him. He may not care what the impartial point of view says, but he could certainly

Jay,
It occurs to me that we ought to step back and make a distinction between the "content" of morality -- or perhaps the "standard" of morality -- and the "force" or "authority" of morality on the other hand. Content
Suppose you look around at the bewildering array of moral arguments and prescriptions and you want to know what it all has in common. When we make moral judgments what are we trying to do, and can we get clearer on a standard that could distinguish better and worse moral judgments. Given what we are trying to do, how far can we judge our success and failure at achieving this end and how can we do better in the future? My answer to this question is that (when we try honestly to make a genuine moral judgment), we are trying to be impartial -- or rather to put certain impartial limits on our pursuit of our own aims and interests. There are many reasons I can offer for this claim, but this is the big picture. Let's move on. Authority
Whatever morality tells us to do, or however it tells us to think, it

BN: Don't know if you caught today's Wright/Lake diavlog, but Eli asked after you. (Forgot to dingalink, sorry, but it's near the end.)

Thanks, Brendan. I was definitely going to get to that one though I . I comment less here, but still watch most of the diavlogs -- and I would certainly not miss a Bob Wright or an Eli Lake diavlog, much less one with both of them. But I hadn't quite gotten to it yet. I see he mentions you and a few others as well -- in fact he says he LIKES you -- he just asks where I've been.