Chapel Hill what what

Watching it now, but those first couple of minutes rank among the most akward things I've ever seen.

Hi Fed. As a huge Pinker fan and, in particular, The Blank Slate, I'm not convinced that Pinker would totally disagree with what Jesse seems to be saying. It's more of a mechanistic difference in how they see things. So, to correct myself, Pinker would perhaps disagree but what is being disagreed with is not a diametrically opposed way of viewing morality, but a case of whether there is a genetically imposed moral area in the brain or whether it's just another part of our genetically imposed learning capacity and that, de facto, moral intuitions will arise or the society will either never get off the ground or it will fall flat in a short time. I don't think either of them has enough empirical evidence at this point and they would probably both agree to that fact.

Yeah. Will stopped doing that as you will see. It was bizarre. It was like he couldn't hear Jesse, yet he didn't say he couldn't hear him.

Will and Jesse talk about Political Correctness, and defend it, presumably from conservative critics. I think, though, that, when they characterize Political Correctness as consisting of, and only consisting of, the stigmatization of certain norms of behavior, they give short shrift to the position of their opponents. What opponents of Political Correctness find most grating about it is the extent to which it forecloses the possibility of actual factual discussion. It creates the possibility that a statement may be an accurate description of reality, but that because that reality is inconvenient for advocates of certain norms, it becomes something incorrect to inquire about — it is literally incorrect politically, but not factually. I think critics of Political Correctness chafe most at the extent to which it is the use of social stigma to enforce a noble lie. As an example, I am reminded of Lawrence Summers, who was compelled to resign as the president of Harvard after suggesting that disparities between men and women working in the sciences might be caused, in part, by innate differences. That statement is factually correct: we have not seen evidence ruling out that hypothesis, and even have reason to believe it

Not metaphorically, but he always looks a little like a Zombie, kind of gray/blue, in contrast to his guests, who look like they have red blood cells in their viens. Must have brains!

JimM47: A good essay. I'm with you that PC-speak and the PC police can go too far. I have my own pet peeves in this regard; e.g., I dream of banning the icky suffix -challenged, I'm beyond tired of the overuse of words like community and folks, and I still wonder why we now have to say Asian when we're talking only about people from China and Japan, and not Indians, Pakistanis, Russians, Arabs, Persians, or Turks. All that said, I think it's more good than bad to frown on the use of a lot of derogatory terms and the idle raising of related topics. Many, if not most, people who claim that they would like to "speak plainly" about "facts" really have little more than a wish to sustain stereotypes. Many, if not most, would like to explain highly complex societal phenomena by reaching first for easy generalizations like skin color, gender, or ethnic origin. I grant that it has become harder to talk about some things that shouldn't be immediately stigmatized, but it really seems to me that it's not at all impossible. You just have to be a little more careful about how and when you say certain things, and maybe willing to

All that said, I think it's more good than bad to frown on the use of a lot of derogatory terms and the idle raising of related topics. Many, if not most, people who claim that they would like to "speak plainly" about "facts" really have little more than a wish to sustain stereotypes.

I certainly agree that some who run afoul of Political Correctness are simply trying to cloak their racism/sexism/homophobia/xenophobia/etc and failing to elude detection — maybe those people are even the majority. But in my mind there is very clearly legitimate speech that is chilled or condemned by Political Correctness that should not be. In determining which category someone falls into context matters immensely, and my problem with Political Correctness is not simply that it often gets it wrong, but that it has a systematic bias towards getting it wrong. Because it relies on social pressure, Political Correctness is least likely to stifle the very type of speech that is most likely to be cloaked racism: writing, and particularly anonymous writing. In contrast it tends to be employed most against the very types of speech that

Pardon me: but is Jesse´s hair GREEN?! or am I just watching this too late at night?...Please advise ---anyway, you two really helped me understand your topic...Thanks

jimM47: Very good response. I especially agree with this:

Because it relies on social pressure, Political Correctness is least likely to stifle the very type of speech that is most likely to be cloaked racism: writing, and particularly anonymous writing. In contrast it tends to be employed most against the very types of speech that are most likely to be honest inquiries unmotivated by prejudice: in person speech by people putting themselves and their reputations on the line, particularly in an academic setting.

It's a problem, no doubt. The only thing I can say is that while there are hurdles to talking about uncomfortable topics, it's generally not impossible to do so. It just requires a little more work. Admittedly, some of that work involves rather tiresome prefatory disclaiming and forelock-tugging. I'll also grant the possibility that specific locales may feature especially hostile environments, and may even be prohibitive in some cases. That's a shame, and the only thing I can say here is what my mama always told me: Who ever told you that life was going to be fair? Which is not to say that we should ever give up trying to make

Not only that, Jim, but it also creates the famous "chilling effect". If I know little about the Summer case (and that is so), then I come away with the conclusion that it is dangerous for me to make this particular PC statement. It may well have been other issues that got him canned, but not in MY mind. I don't see a way to defend PC talk ever. First of all, I'm huge on freedom of speech and I don't just mean it in the Constitutional sense. There are many arenas where true free speech gets stifled with the shrug - "this isn't a Free Speech issue" (note the upper case). People are a little too testy about defending their "free speech free" zones (think of blogs, churches, homes, etc). Secondly, I agree with Jim's noting that PC can prevent us arriving at facts. So, what's the answer to prevent what BJ fears if you don't have a certain amount of PC? How about simply acknowledging that facts about how the world IS, should not make us conclude that it's the way the world ought to be or how we ought to treat people?

Can we please note a few things about the cognitivist/rationalist side of the philosophical debate over morality (as opposed to whatever debates may go under that name in psychology)?
First, as I see it, the cognitivist says that moral judgments make cognitive claims. From this, it in no way follows that "feelings" are not involved. If my body is out of balance, I will have a certain "feeling" of being out of balance and about to fall. This feeling will be the basis for a judgment that I am out of balance and about to fall -- a fully cognitive judgment.
And despite Jesse's rejection of cognitivist accounts of emotion, he gives a seemingly rather cognitivist account, which makes the "feeling" part of the emotion correspond to a kind of evidence for a certain judgment -- in much the way that my sense of being out of balance is evidence for the judgment that I am really out of balance -- here:
http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...9:31&out=12:40 In his example the feeling of fear is a sign that there is something dangerous around. And creatures like ourselves, not only mammals, but self-conscious mammals, are capable of distinguishing between cases where our

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Can we please note a few things about the cognitivist/rationalist side of the philosophical debate over morality (as opposed to whatever debates may go under that name in psychology)?
First, as I see it, the cognitivist says that moral judgments make cognitive claims. From this, it in no way follows that "feelings" are not involved. If my body is out of balance, I will have a certain "feeling" of being out of balance and about to fall. This feeling will be the basis for a judgment that I am out of balance and about to fall -- a fully cognitive judgment.

I think you need to distinguish between "feeling" referring to sensory/perceptual experience and interpretation (like being out of balance) from the "feeling" associated with the experience of emotions.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: And despite Jesse's rejection of cognitivist accounts of emotion, he gives a seemingly rather cognitivist account, which makes the "feeling" part of the emotion correspond to a kind of evidence for a certain judgment -- in much the way that my sense of being out of balance is evidence for the judgment that I am really out of balance -- here:
http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...9:31&out=12:40

My interpretation of what he said is

I am surprised that they didn't discuss what causes an emotion. Is emotion outside our cognitive processing? I'm pretty sure that we can change many of our emotional reactions by changing how we think. For example: if you highly value some object, you will react emotionally to its destruction. If you change how much you value it, you will not react emotionally. Emotion often seems primary because the cognitive assessment or valuation happens so quickly that the cognitive aspect that often precedes emotional reactions is not recognized consciously unless you train yourself to be sensitive to it. Emotions might be saliency indicators that something is happening which we find highly significant and emotions motivate the organism to respond. So an emotion indicates how much you value something. Emotions are based on moral values. I don't think that Prinz's example of priming people with disgust contradicts my view. Considering that emotions summon resources for a response, the experimental result is not surprising.

If emotions are based on moral values explain how it is that Hitler loved Eva Braun and his dog Blondi.

Quoting Happy Hominid: Hi Fed. As a huge Pinker fan and, in particular, The Blank Slate, I'm not convinced that Pinker would totally disagree with what Jesse seems to be saying. It's more of a mechanistic difference in how they see things. .......

I don't think either of them has enough empirical evidence at this point and they would probably both agree to that fact.

yeah, you could be right but it's a really complicated yet, like you implied, vague discussion because research is just getting started in this type of thing. i'd have to re-read both books and then listen again (which i'm way too lazy to do) but Jesse just struck me as being pretty "squishy" in certain areas.
however, the first thing that came to mind was Pinker's list of universal human traits in the footnotes of his book. picturing the hundreds of examples makes the other side seem pretty weak to me. if anyone hasn't tried "Human" - it's freakin' sick - definitely one of the better (pop) neuroscience books i've read and it's dense as can be. not an easy read to be sure.

Quoting travis68: Emotions might be saliency indicators that something is happening which we find highly significant and emotions motivate the organism to respond. So an emotion indicates how much you value something. Emotions are based on moral values.

Technically emotions are a primary response. A stimulus may be, for example identified as noxious and this one in turn triggers a set of physiological responses that prepares for the appropriate action. The apparent disagreement seems to be that "cognition" may affect this mechanism at different steps. For example, we can desensitize to certain noxious stimulus and over time stop reacting. Or we can have cognition interfere at the level between preparation for action and action itself ("biting your tongue" for example). A valued object becomes an extension of ourselves, in a sense, so that when there is threat of loss, or any other risk, we respond with the same repertoire as if the threat was directed at us. Here is where evolutionary psychology gives us some hints. Since we can react to all possible stimuli, we tune out those that have no consequence, and react to those that are relevant (salient) for our safety and well-being. This

Finally, when Will and Jesse get around to the question of normativity, Jesse suggests that, depending on what "we" want to do as a society, we may be able to determine which moral norms are better than others. But that "we" is precisely where he begs the question. Will speaks of what "we" want as being a matter for negotiation. Is that fair and impartial negotiation or strong-arm negotiation? If what "we" want is determined only by the dominant class or the men or the non-slaves, is that really what "we" want?

I thought Jesse suggested that "we" can only ask the question as individuals. He says that and explicates it here: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...5:20&out=56:17

I'll look into it. Thanks for the heads up.

Here is a clear case of Will and Jesse both totally misreading the question of moral reality by psychologizing the question: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...0&out=00:28:03 The question (as I said above) of whether there is a moral reality which ought to guide (some of) our moral reactions IS NOT, NOT, NOT the same question as whether we have a built-in moral sense. Only an a question-begging assumption that there is no such thing as moral reality could lead to so obvious a conflation of totally different questions. Nothing is more obvious from experiment and experience than that we do not have a good sense for probability. Even experts in probability are liable to make stupid mistakes in estimating probability in ordinary life. Does it follow that there is no reality that OUGHT to guide our ascriptions of probability? If I believe that current physics is getting at physical reality, am I somehow committed to the view that modern physics was inevitable or that every culture in the world is just as "right" about physical reality as is "the modern West"? (I'm not suggesting that the West is morally superior to other cultures -- only

Hi again Bloggin, I want to go on record as saying that what you offer in this post is wisdom. Our purported lack of a distinctive built-in moral sense is not the same question as whether or not there is a moral reality. I liked your post so much that I hesitate to add this caveat... see I just don't know if we mean the same thing by "moral reality." I'll go out on a limb and say that the diavloggers, by 'moral reality' are meaning something similar to what I mean in our long-running thread. Hopefully since we've been around a couple of times on this one, I won't be out of line using the ambiguous term "metaphysical" to describe what the participants are getting at with the concept of moral reality. So do you think it would be beneficial at this still early stage of the discussion to get the meanings out on the table? I don't hear the participants as saying that moral systems can't be rational, or even universalizable in principle.

This dingalink is way too childish, right?

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Here is a clear case of Will and Jesse both totally misreading the question of moral reality by psychologizing the question: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/128...0&out=00:28:03

The question (as I said above) of whether there is a moral reality which ought to guide (some of) our moral reactions IS NOT, NOT, NOT the same question as whether we have a built-in moral sense. Only an a question-begging assumption that there is no such thing as moral reality could lead to so obvious a conflation of totally different questions.

Nothing is more obvious from experiment and experience than that we do not have a good sense for probability. Even experts in probability are liable to make stupid mistakes in estimating probability in ordinary life. Does it follow that there is no reality that OUGHT to guide our ascriptions of probability?

If I believe that current physics is getting at physical reality, am I somehow committed to the view that modern physics was inevitable or that every culture in the world is just as "right" about physical reality as is "the modern West"? (I'm not suggesting that the West is morally superior to other cultures -- only

Quoting AemJeff: But surely, if there's some analog of physical reality underlying morality, there's no reason to consider it's existence independently of human psychology. (As I read that sentence back, I see it contains an internal contradiction.) Why should we assume than an independent, objective place where morality can be measured independently of psychology is even worth considering? The idea just seems to come freighted with a lot of unnecessary baggage, and seems (to me) to beg for an application of Occam's Razor.

By unnecessary baggage, I mean I don't see how the idea stands alone. It needs some kind of supporting structure against which its calibrations can be measured. What is that?

By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena) - for example starting with self-interest and empathy then filtered through cultural norms - you don't need to assume the existence of, or build from scratch, some sort of objective superstructure (moral reality) in which the system hangs.

If you do assume that ideas of morality follow as a self-organized consequence of human psychology, doesn't it make sense to argue from psychology?

Thank you AemJeff. Depending on our professional biases we tend to view

Quoting Ocean: I think you need to distinguish between "feeling" referring to sensory/perceptual experience and interpretation (like being out of balance) from the "feeling" associated with the experience of emotions.

And what is this distinction I am to make? Jesse suggests that when I feel certain "fearful" sensations, I use that as an indicator or a "sign" that I am in danger, as I use certain hard to describe "vertiginous" feelings as indicators that I am out of balance. The "vertiginous" feelings may fire off even when I am actually not ready to fall (when I am lying in bed, for example), and the fearful sensations may fire off when I am not in danger (when there is really nothing to fear).
You (and Jesse) may feel there is some distinction to be made here (which would presumably make emotions less cognitive in some way), but my point is that this distinction has not been either made or justified.

My interpretation of what he said is simply that the emotion arises first and then the feeling is what links to the secondary cognitive part of the judgment. His "criticism" of rationalists had to do with not acknowledging the emotional origin of the

Quoting AemJeff: But surely, if there's some analog of physical reality underlying morality, there's no reason to consider it's existence independently of human psychology. (As I read that sentence back, I see it contains an internal contradiction.) Why should we assume than an independent, objective place where morality can be measured independently of psychology is even worth considering? The idea just seems to come freighted with a lot of unnecessary baggage, and seems (to me) to beg for an application of Occam's Razor.

By unnecessary baggage, I mean I don't see how the idea stands alone. It needs some kind of supporting structure against which its calibrations can be measured. What is that?

By contrast, if you assume that morality is entirely subjective (based in psychological phenomena) - for example starting with self-interest and empathy then filtered through cultural norms - you don't need to assume the existence of, or build from scratch, some sort of objective superstructure (moral reality) in which the system hangs.

If you do assume that ideas of morality follow as a self-organized consequence of human psychology, doesn't it make sense to argue from psychology?

Let's back up a bit. I am NOT primarily offering a particular picture of

Ocean,
You seem to object to my use of the word "psychologizing" on some very general terms. What I meant is that the diavloggers start with a non-psychological claim (there is a moral reality to which some moral claims correspond) and they identify it with a very particular view about certain psychological mechanisms.
My claim is that this identification is wholly unwarranted. Moral realism could easily be true even if the particular psychological claims they identify it with are false; and moral realism could be false even if there is a specially selected "moral sense". I'm certainly not claiming that psychology has absolutely nothing to do with morality or moral reality. I'm simply saying that eitehr one of the following views could be true without the other: A) Human beings have evolved with a "purpose-built" moral sense (something like our linguistic sense).
and
B) Some moral claims are literally true, and true independently of whether people happen to believe them or accept them as their own norms.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: A quick comment on this:

Here, you appear to confuse two quite different notions of "subjective"
In one sense, all of psychology is "subjective" -- it concerns what is going on in peoople's minds. But it DOES NOT follow from this that psychology is "subjective" in the sense that whatever you think about it is correct. There is a psychological reality which is independent of what people think about it: for example people may believe in the Oedipus Complex, but that doesn't mean that the Oedipus Complex is a psychological reality. Commonsense psychological views may be wrong in various ways as well.
Moral reality may well be psychological, but it doesn't follow that moral reality is identical with our beliefs about moral reality. Moral reality may not be identical with our moral norms, even though moral reality lies within the psycho-social realm.

I need to think about the first part of your respsonse. Regarding the above, it's possible I'm abusing the term I (it wouldn't be the first time), but what I have in mind is that there's no external yardstick, no way to fix a quantitative judgment that could stand empirically. Three olives is more than two

The point that we can modify responses to emotion through mechanisms that imply cognition seems obvious enough, but the argument that emotion is a primary response (to a stimulus) in an emotion -> action line gets into some circularity once you recoginize the way in which specific stimuli can become attatched to emotional triggers as you discuss. This implies some mechanism which I will call cognition at a subconscious level which comes into play before the emotion is triggered, thus emotion is not a "starting point" or primary response connected directly to the stimulus. Other activity must precede it. This is not to suggest a simple "perception -> subconscious filter -> emotion -> conscious/subconscious filter -> action -> rationalization of the action and emotion" model is a sufficient understanding of what takes place. I think that this does offer some degree of understanding and is a typical human attempt to linearize a more complex system in order to be able to grasp it and gain some insights. Throw in our human Predictably Irrational behavior (previous diavlog plug) and stir. The model leaves a lot of questions regarding the majority of

Quoting cragger: The diavlog however was concerned pretty exclusively with moral sense however, the determination of how we do act, rather than the more philosophical question of an external moral ideal of how we should act. I found it odd that Prinz seemed to say that should one direct his behavior according to an idea of moral behavior, rather than in accordance with an internalized emotional response, that one was not acting morally. That acton would become moral only when the individual and/or society emotionally coupled it.

This gets to their contention about sociopaths that see moral values as simply rules to follow. I think the intuition is that unless someone is emotionally attached to some value, we don't really trust their commitment. If you just see it as a rule to follow, you might not be as diligent in following the rule compared to someone with an emotional commitment to the rule.

Quoting cragger: This is not to suggest a simple "perception -> subconscious filter -> emotion -> conscious/subconscious filter -> action -> rationalization of the action and emotion" model is a sufficient understanding of what takes place.

I completely agree that our knowledge of the brain doesn't allow us much confidence to speculate about these ideas and fMRI studies are pretty much worthless at this stage in the technology. I also am in agreement that there must be some processing that occurs before an emotion is triggered, and this is where I disagree with Ocean. I think it's quite clear that a person's moral judgment about the morality of homosexuality can change over a lifetime. The emotions expressed also change, perhaps from a feeling of outrage to one of indifference. For me, I think it's clear that the emotions *follow* the change in the moral judgment. The evidence that I have is that people's emotions change after they change their way of thinking about something. I am curious to see whether anyone disagrees with that.

Quoting AemJeff: I need to think about the first part of your respsonse. Regarding the above, it's possible I'm abusing the term I (it wouldn't be the first time), but what I have in mind is that there's no external yardstick, no way to fix a quantitative judgment that could stand empirically.

Three olives is more than two olives is a different kind of assertion than rape is a greater crime than theft.

Your initial interpretation of "subjective" is "psychological" or "having to do with mental states -- the first of these is your parenthetical gloss on "subjective." You then seem to move to something like what you offer here: where people disagree (or rather appear to disagree) about a "subjective" issue, neither is right and neither is wrong. As I pointed out with my Oedipus Complex example, this inference is bad. And that point about the inference is my main concern. I wonder whether you would be willing to admit that being raped is a greater harm than being deprived of say 50 dollars -- because I think its being a greater crime is dependent upon its being a greater harm. Would you at least concede that a

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Your initial interpretation of "subjective" is "psychological" or "having to do with mental states -- the first of these is your parenthetical gloss on "subjective." You then seem to move to something like what you offer here: where people disagree (or rather appear to disagree) about a "subjective" issue, neither is right and neither is wrong. As I pointed out with my Oedipus Complex example, this inference is bad. And that point about the inference is my main concern.

I wonder whether you would be willing to admit that being raped is a greater harm than being deprived of say 50 dollars -- because I think its being a greater crime is dependent upon its being a greater harm. Would you at least concede that a tiny scratch on the finger is a lesser harm than being drawn and quartered?

Quickly, on the definition of "subjective," I think I was referring to it in terms of "psychology" as a way of saying that moral judgments reference nothing that exists independently of mind, no outside standard. That's an awkward exegesis, which probably means that I didn't choose my phrasing very well. I've quoted what you said about the inference you're

Quoting travis68: I also am in agreement that there must be some processing that occurs before an emotion is triggered, and this is where I disagree with Ocean.

For me, I think it's clear that the emotions *follow* the change in the moral judgment. The evidence that I have is that people's emotions change after they change their way of thinking about something. I am curious to see whether anyone disagrees with that.

I missed all these very interesting comments due to work! Of course interesting stuff happens at work too... There are so many comments I would like to respond to that I decided to start with this one because it is easier (I think), and also addresses others. These "brain" processes don't occur in a linear sequence (serial type). It is more like a parallel circuit in some portions, then convergent, and then divergent with a series of other parallel parts. The example of fear is a good one because it is easier to illustrate. The simplest way is dangerous stimulus leads to fear, fear leads to preparation for action, and then some decision about the action or simply an "impulsive" act.
The first part is the stimulus, whatever that is. The

@Ocean: Thanks for the response. I agree broadly with what you say. Reflecting further on my previous statement that emotions follow moral judgment, I think I failed to take into account the possibility that one can have an emotional response and control it and act contrary to the emotion. So in that case, emotion is not following moral judgment. In that situation, it seems that we are at war within ourselves and are holding two different values simultaneously. I am thinking of an example such as homosexuality where a person intellectually agrees that there is nothing wrong with it but at an emotional level is still discomfited by it.

Quoting travis68: @Ocean: Thanks for the response. I agree broadly with what you say. Reflecting further on my previous statement that emotions follow moral judgment, I think I failed to take into account the possibility that one can have an emotional response and control it and act contrary to the emotion. So in that case, emotion is not following moral judgment. In that situation, it seems that we are at war within ourselves and are holding two different values simultaneously. I am thinking of an example such as homosexuality where a person intellectually agrees that there is nothing wrong with it but at an emotional level is still discomfited by it.

That's exactly right. It's the struggle between our instinctual tendencies and our best judgment. Moral norms set the boundaries that define what is acceptable behavior from what is not.

Hi Jeff,
Sorry my responses are so long in coming these days. I recognize that we were all taught in high school that there was no moral truth, and that this dogma has taken on the status of common sense -- of the blindingly obvious, even -- as a result. But before our high school teachers taught us this, it was a bunch of arguments made by philosophers (like A.J. Ayer) against the prevailing commonsense moral realism. The arguments offered by those philosophers were based upon assumptions that we now recognize to be false and unworkable in every other sphere of knowledge. We need to re-confront the question with an open mind.

Quoting AemJeff: Quickly, on the definition of "subjective," I think I was referring to it in terms of "psychology" as a way of saying that moral judgments reference nothing that exists independently of mind, no outside standard. That's an awkward exegesis, which probably means that I didn't choose my phrasing very well.

Here you attempt to straddle the same chasm you attempted to straddle last time -- this time with the aid of the very expansive term "external". Consider the question of whether I am in pain. Surely

Thanks for the response, BN. I can't fully respond to you right now, but I'm interested in a clarification. Would Moral Reality have existed before there were beings capable of judging morality? If there were two unrelated species, both of which were capable of practicing ,and actually practiced, moral judgment, would they each be drawing their judgments from the same Moral Reality?

BN I found the diavlog to be a pretty persuasive description of how moral norms are formed. How is it dependant, as you suggest, on any particular definition of how an alternate that you call moral realism might be defined? Does it really matter whether that moral realism is the product of a "psychic module" perhaps operating like the "language acquisition device", or is the result of an intellectual exercise (e.g. the Categorical Imperative), or represents some other definition of the moral absolute? I admit that on first encountering Ayer as a young undergrad I found the emotive basis for ethics pretty unsatisfying compared to a more intellectual l approach such as Kant's. Then again, that may reflect my emotive response as a student preferring to think myself undergoing intellectual development. As discussed in the diavlog however, moral norms vary in societies, and over time, in ways influenced by existing conditions. There was also some discussion of mechanisms such as social approval and disapproval that are involved in the changing of emotion-based moral norms. Doesn't this really allow for the coexistance of an intellectual moral ideal or as you term it

Quoting AemJeff: Thanks for the response, BN. I can't fully respond to you right now, but I'm interested in a clarification. Would Moral Reality have existed before there were beings capable of judging morality? If there were two unrelated species, both of which were capable of practicing ,and actually practiced, moral judgment, would they each be drawing their judgments from the same Moral Reality?

Sorry that I didn't see this post until now, Jeff. Jay J brought it to my attention and I answered it in a reply to him on the other thread. Although it's not ideal, I'm going to just reproduce my answer to him below (including a bit more than directly responds to your most recent point). If any of it is unclear, please let me know:

In other words, I think something like "Morality claims to have tapped into some feature of the universe like matter or energy," needs to be posited before I feel comfortable stating D. And this can happen *before* we decide whether morality has successfully described the world through these claims.

This is rather vague -- like matter or energy HOW? -- entirely non-psychological? something that existed before humans or any self-conscious rational agents ever

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: This standard is a bit better -- at least Kant turns out to be a moral realist on this view. But seemingly Aristotle (and quite possibly Plato) does not. To stipulate from the outset a definition of "moral realist" that doesn't even consider some of our paradigm cases of moral realists strikes me pretty high-handed.

Aristotle and Plato, and even Kant to a certain extent, imagined a significantly different universe than the one we now believe we occupy. The Greeks saw themselves at the center of creation. We believe that there's nothing special about us at all. That's a significantly different worldview and it doesn't support all of the same assumptions. If they held that some things were universal, based on a belief in their own (our own) exceptionalism that's contradicted by what we know (or believe we know) about the world at this date, how reluctant should we be to, let's say, define down the necessity of the content of some of those beliefs. I understand your point about humility, and I acknowledge that it's absurd for non-specialist (to put it delicately) like myself to make that assertion, but still...

Quoting AemJeff: Aristotle and Plato, and even Kant to a certain extent, imagined a significantly different universe than the one we now believe we occupy. The Greeks saw themselves at the center of creation. We believe that there's nothing special about us at all. That's a significantly different worldview and it doesn't support all of the same assumptions. If they held that some things were universal, based on a belief in their own (our own) exceptionalism that's contradicted by what we know (or believe we know) about the world at this date, how reluctant should we be to, let's say, define down the necessity of the content of some of those beliefs.

I understand your point about humility, and I acknowledge that it's absurd for non-specialist (to put it delicately) like myself to make that assertion, but still...

I don't think you understood my point. It was not an objection to you or any non-expert talking about the subject. My point is that it's possible to define a view you want to attack so restrictively that nearly everyone has to reject it, but that is not a fair strategy of argument.
Plato and Aristotle both held

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: I don't think you understood my point. It was not an objection to you or any non-expert talking about the subject. My point is that it's possible to define a view you want to attack so restrictively that nearly everyone has to reject it, but that is not a fair strategy of argument.
Plato and Aristotle both held views of moral truth that could easily allow for a difference between moral truth for humans and moral truth for Martians. They regarded "justice" for instance as the "health" of soul and society.
My point is that you (and people who really SHOULD know better -- e.g., Shaun Nichols) are defining moral realism UP, not down. It isn't quite like attacking strawmen, because Kant actually occupies the position -- I mean he thinks morality applies to all rational agents as such; I don't mean that he accepts all the stupidities unsympathetic types attribute to him. But it would be rather like attacking all of free market economics by attacking just one school of thought within it.

I'd be interested to see how your objection here (which maybe I just don't understand) applies to my development of

Quoting AemJeff: Hi BN, the "non-specialist" reference was just me poking a little fun at myself for suggesting something I thought might be seen as somewhat arrogant.

It may be that my bottom line objection is really to the nomenclature, we'll see. Defining "moral reality" seems to me to imply a universally applicable set of rules to behavior by... is "moral agents" a useful term? I'll use it for the moment. Maybe I assume too much, but in this context "reality" seems to imply a fundamental, fixed basis - e.g. the proposition Slavery is not a moral practice might be considered always true. Or, if that's too simplistic, moral reality could be a set of rules by which we could judge the proposition I used within a given context. Forced to judge both of these options I'd reject the first, unconditionally. I don't believe there can be simple moral propositions about which a fixed truth value could be universally agreed upon. If we allow for meta-propositions (rules for creating true propositions in particular contexts) I'm not as sure of myself. I don't believe such things are possible, but it would require a much subtler argument to rule it out, I think.

I haven't really made my

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Are you simply saying that the morality of a certain behavior may depend upon the circumstances surrounding the behavior and the motivations and intentions of the agent who produces the behavior? For example, are you just saying that whether or not lying is wrong depends on whether you are lying in order to con someone out of his life savings or in order to save a Tutsi from the Hutu mob? That's just moral common sense, isn't it?

Why should the moral realist be any more committed to the claim that lying is always and everwhere wrong than the temperature-realist is committed to the claim that it is always and everywhere 70 degrees -- both in the Sahara and at the top of Everest?

There are certainly weaker and stronger moral values. The examples you brought up involved lying, but probably weren’t moral acts equivalent to one another. The bad part about lying in a con is the con itself. Compared to that, the lie is incidental. There doesn’t seem to be a lot of “moral capital” at stake in a lie. For other acts, rape and

Hi Jeff, I'm taking your post a bit out of order:

It’s the claim of universality, the assertion that there’s something in the universe that predated humanity, and which inherently judges one act over another, that I have a hard time with. “Human morality,” feels truer to me than “moral reality.” The effect that distinction has on what I do tomorrow is pretty slight, but seems to me very important to understanding the nature of the thing itself.

I guess you are not actually talking to me, but rather to my distant cousin, Strawman Noggin? I seem to recall saying a few times that the moral realist is not committed to the view that moral truth predates human beings. Of course, I could be wrong about that, but then I think you owe me an argument that it really is necessary after all.
Also you say 'something in the universe that "inherently" judges one act over another' -- normally only conscious beings make judgments. Are you imputing to me a belief, not only in a moral reality that predated humans, but a divine reality?
The essential issue for the (objectivist) moral realist is (I repeat) not, not NOT whether moral reality "predated" human beings. The essential issue

BN, as I’ve said, the phrase “moral reality” seems to me to imply something stable and unchanging. Maybe it doesn’t. Part of what I’m trying to do here is engage on that idea. I floated the alternative term “human morality” to describe what I think you’re talking about in my previous post. “Reality,” in the metaphorical sense used here, describes something which doesn’t react to context, it is the context. I’m open to the suggestion that my interpretation is wrong, but it is what I believe. I heard you when you said you didn’t believe it: I just don’t understand the justification, and I think the distinction is important. Speaking of metaphors, I’m not likely to float a deist argument – when I talk about the “universe judging” what I have in mind is the idea that an observer would have an unchanging basis for judgment regardless of context. The other half of my argument is that the terms useful in discussing morality are sensitive to context. I don’t think I’m overspecifying a meaning for “harm,” for example. On the contrary, I thought you might accuse me of using a definition so vague that I was ducking the question in exactly the opposite direction! The idea of

Quoting AemJeff: BN, as I’ve said, the phrase “moral reality” seems to me to imply something stable and unchanging. Maybe it doesn’t.

Seems to you perhaps, but I don't see that at all. How would you argue for this implication?
Does the term "physical reality" imply that the universe is "stable and unchanging?" Since the world is actually constantly changing, does it follow that there is no physical reality whatsoever? Reality is opposed to "appearance" and "what we think", not to change. Catastrophists and gradualists in geology both argue over what reality is (really) like -- catastrophists are not arguing that there's no reality only dreams and illusions. No, they are arguing that reality changes more catastrophically than some people THINK.

Part of what I’m trying to do here is engage on that idea. I floated the alternative term “human morality” to describe what I think you’re talking about in my previous post. “Reality,” in the metaphorical sense used here, describes something which doesn’t react to context, it is the context.
I’m open to the suggestion that my interpretation is wrong, but it is what I believe. I heard you when you said you didn’t believe it: I just don’t understand the justification, and I think the distinction is important.

All

Seems to you perhaps, but I don't see that at all. How would you argue for this implication?
Does the term "physical reality" imply that the universe is "stable and unchanging?" Since the world is actually constantly changing, does it follow that there is no physical reality whatsoever? Reality is opposed to "appearance" and "what we think", not to change. Catastrophists and gradualists in geology both argue over what reality is (really) like -- catastrophists are not arguing that there's no reality only dreams and illusions. No, they are arguing that reality changes more catastrophically than some people THINK.

When I look up "reality" (I used dictionary.com) here is the definition that most closely resembles what I imagine the term means:

5. Philosophy.
- a. something that exists independently of ideas concerning it.
- b. something that exists independently of all other things and from which all other things derive.

At the very least "moral reality," if this definition applies, is independent of the actors and circumstances comprising "morality." That's the sense in which I mean "unchanging." Maybe "unyielding," would get the sense across better. The overall point is that changing the underlying facts ought not to affect a "moral reality" in any way, especially in terms of the

Quoting AemJeff: When I look up "reality" (I used dictionary.com) here is the definition that most closely resembles what I imagine the term means:

Perhaps Dictionary.com was typographically a bit unclear -- I think (a) and (b) are surely meant to be different definitions! At any rate, (a) alone comes pretty close to what I have been talking about, and there is nothing about (a) that necessarily implies (b).
Apart from that, we should recognize that dictionary definitions have just about zero importance in philosophy. I have been repeatedly telling you what *I* mean by 'moral reality" (and what I don't mean), and I have been saying that understood in this way, you have not provided an argument against it. Your response is to cite your own definition and say that by THAT definition, it's not defensible. Well, you may well be right, but given that we are talking about different things, it doesn't follow that I am not right as well.
Actually what you do is reject a really crazy version of moral realism that really no sophisticated realist would accept. Then you infer that subjectivism or conventionalism must be true. If I were faced with only the choice between stupid realism (strawman realism) and relativism, yeah maybe I'd pick relativism

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: I have been repeatedly telling you what *I* mean by 'moral reality" (and what I don't mean), and I have been saying that understood in this way, you have not provided an argument against it. Your response is to cite your own definition and say that by THAT definition, it's not defensible. Well, you may well be right, but given that we are talking about different things, it doesn't follow that I am not right as well.

If what I'm doing is the above, then I'm not accomplishing what I've set out to do. Partly that's to set one definition against the other in an effort to understand. I'm certainly not asserting that your view is wrong. I’ve created some confusion with a bad phrase - “stable and unchanging” reflected a poorly thought out expression of what I’m trying say. With some luck, I can clarify that. Hopefully the following will seem responsive to your objections. I'm going to try to present a cohesive argument instead of going through your post line by line. But, let me start by contrasting the following:

Your argument appars to rest on this principle:
1. If there are facts of a certain sort (chemical, biological, psychological, moral, whatever) which may be

There is a class of facts that do not refer to externalities; call them psychological facts. They require an observer and explicitly refer to the observer and (if there's a distinction) the observer's senses. Psychological facts have no direct bearing on the external world. In that sense, the nature of reality cannot be affected by this class of facts. That's not to say reality can't be affected in some indirect way - I can get angry and kick a rock out of my way, for example. But whatever I believe about the rock has no effect on the nature of the rock.

Geographical facts are psychological. They refer to countries and economies and various constructs that are dependent on our existence. Geological facts aren't, plate tectonics would occur with or without us. Although we don't have a complete theory of planetary geology, that's a limitation of our knowledge. The principles involved don't depend on our understanding.

I assert that moral facts are "psychological facts" as I've described. The phrase "moral reality" sounds like it explicitly posits some external extension of morality – claims that there's some sense in which in which moral facts are "real." That

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: If you disagree, let me see if I can make a Christian scientist of you.

There's no question but that I'll have to sleep on the substance of your response, but the above made me laugh out loud. Well said!

Thanks, Jeff. If my replies become more astringent from now on, you'll have only yourself to blame for encouraging me.

Quoting Bloggin' Noggin: Thanks, Jeff. If my replies become more astringent from now on, you'll have only yourself to blame for encouraging me.

Bring it on! But, could you please pound just a little less vigorously with this relentless logic you seem to insist on bringing to the table? You'd think that's the only thing that matters!

We need a definition of reality that distinguishes between a voice in a schizophrenic’s head, which is undoubtedly something that actually exists – the schizophrenic’s experience truly exists, even if what he’s experiencing doesn’t – from, let’s say, a headache. I'm arguing that morality is not intrinsically sensory; it’s denotative, a tool that helps to classify sensory data. The question for me is, if you unwrap its symbolism – attempt to resolve the symbolic chains leading from the terms of morality – do you eventually find things that don't just refer to other symbols? In other words, how do we prove that morality isn’t just circular? To put it another way, in what sense can the belief that morality is just a formalism, similar to language – an analogy that seems compelling to me – be disproved? What’s different between my self-styled “psychological facts” and other facts? I think it’s that the former are never first order, they’re always referential to other facts. A “headache” is a reference to a sensory experience. The underlying physical cause of the headache is an empirically testable phenomenon. That last seems like a better path to a notion of reality than what I've tried

Quoting AemJeff;87704We need a definition of reality that distinguishes between a voice in a schizophrenic’s head, which is undoubtedly something that actually exists – the schizophrenic’s experience truly exists, even if what he’s experiencing doesn’t – from, let’s say, a headache. [/QUOTE:
You puzzle me here. Both are "subjective" experiences in the sense that they are mind-dependent things, but they are both perfectly real. I don't really see what the relevance of any such distinction between headaches and mental voices would be to the problem your argument got into last time.

I'm arguing that morality is not intrinsically sensory; it’s denotative, a tool that helps to classify sensory data. The question for me is, if you unwrap its symbolism – attempt to resolve the symbolic chains leading from the terms of morality – do you eventually find things that don't just refer to other symbols? In other words, how do we prove that morality isn’t just circular?

What you seem to be groping toward is the standard I myself suggested before (if I recall correctly): a field is "subjective" in the relevant sense if and only if any true propositions of that field are true only because someone or some group accepts them as true.
If we are careful not to be too demanding about "accept as true" (if we don't require explicit knowledge of the principle, but only implicit acceptance), then this is true

I see a difference from the subjective description of “pain,” e.g. from the physical phenomenon. You can measure a rise in blood pressure, you can detect certain classes of electrical activity in the nervous system, etc… All those measurements can be correlated to the answer to the question “are you in pain?” But that’s different from pain itself as an objective, measurable phenomenon.

To put it another way, in what sense can the belief that morality is just a formalism, similar to language – an analogy that seems compelling to me – be disproved?

Why must this be "disproved"?

You’re right; I overemphasized the burden of proof, here. But that’s still a core question for me in this debate.

What I'm suggesting is that your problem with objective moral facts is a consequence of a much broader problem you perceive with objective normative facts in general. Is that correct?

Yes. Absolutely. I’m completely comfortable with local norms. I feel a need to reject the very notion of “global norms.” (Even the phrase seems somehow inconsistent.) The issue of locality however, is fairly abstract when everything of which we have any direct knowledge is “local,” and that’s obviously the case when we’re

Quoting AemJeff: Yes. Absolutely. I’m completely comfortable with local norms. I feel a need to reject the very notion of “global norms.” (Even the phrase seems somehow inconsistent.) The issue of locality however, is fairly abstract when everything of which we have any direct knowledge is “local,” and that’s obviously the case when we’re discussing something like morality on this scale. It’s one thing to assert that something is true for every human. It’s another to assert that something is always true.
I’m not particularly concerned with how we might treat the Martians when we encounter them, at least not in this conversation. But if our notions of anything are particular, if they’re not always true, then they must have come about as a response to local conditions. If that’s the case, then it seems hard to argue that if you were to re-roll the tape, as it were: loop back and start over from some arbitrary point, that our notions would necessarily align with what we currently hold.

Hi Jeff, Here you seem to conflate "locality" and "subjectivity" on the one hand and "universality" and "objectivity" on the other.
Let me give you an illustration of how the