In fairness, EW's view of the situation is not exactly the one presented in the diavlog. I just say this lest ye be dissuaded from watching. No doubt that it's a bleak situation, but I found the diavlog slightly more hopeful than EW's view. I'm not sure why. Maybe it's just helpful to hear problems specifically identified, rather than having a vague sense of an overall mess. And I will agree with him that it was quite informative. Good get, Mark. The really interesting point, for me, that Kristèle raised was the tension between the military and the aid groups on the matter of where resources should be distributed. Both, it sounds like, have a very good case -- the military would like to win hearts and minds in the regions where they're stationed, and the aid groups would like to take the larger view and pick out the regions most in need. On the opium problem: does anyone have a thought about the idea of the US and other governments just buying the crop for a few years? When I think about how much money goes into the War on Drugs (tm), I wonder if an argument

Quoting bjkeefe: On the opium problem: does anyone have a thought about the idea of the US and other governments just buying the crop for a few years? When I think about how much money goes into the War on Drugs (tm), I wonder if an argument could be made that it would be cost-neutral to do this. I wonder also if in doing so, a little more trust could be built with Afghan farmers, so that as we try to encourage them to move to other crops, we'd have a better chance of selling them on the idea. Probably a naive thought, but I thought I'd throw it out there.

I don't think this will solve the problem it's trying to solve. On the one hand, it doesn't really deal with the incentive to grow opium in the first place: the cash return per acre compared with other crops. Also consider the conditions of sale. You can be sure that there would be a number of terms binding on the sellers to, among other things prevent them from also selling to traffickers. Those and the price would inevitably be subject to constraints set by

AemJeff: Good points. Just for the sake of discussion, here are some responses that probably are no less naive than my first thought.

Quoting AemJeff: On the one hand, it doesn't really deal with the incentive to grow opium in the first place: the cash return per acre compared with other crops.

Not much to disagree with here. I guess I'm imagining that there would be clear communication that this was a short-term, stop-gap program; e.g., tell the farmers, "This is only going to last for three years. We understand that you need to do this to eat, but we encourage you to start thinking about alternatives now, because we're going to start cracking down as soon as we can get around to it. Nothing personal, but there it is. Here, would you like to watch this video on growing alternative crops X, Y, and Z?" Maybe we could have other Afghans helping to convey this message.

Also consider the conditions of sale. You can be sure that there would be a number of terms binding on the sellers to, among other things prevent them from also selling to traffickers. Those and the price would inevitably be subject to

Thanks for another enlightening UN Plaza discussion. Americans have a special responsibility to cough up some dinero for Iraqi and Afghani refugees, so follow the link and do the nice thing.

Here's a link to an interesting alternative to poppies:
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02222008/watch2.html

Thx, graz. You're right.

I'm not so sure about the downloadable music analogy. The differences of scale and application are so great that I just don't believe it's valid. The farmers don't have a wide array of choices, and one choice they definitely don't have is to stop farming. Choices about digital music are trivial and if you choose not to download your life isn't going to change. I also think that threats of additional enforcement will tend to sound hollow. If enforcement was really an option (Afghanistan is huge, remote, and full of a lot of difficult terrain) then I don't think options like the plan you're describing would have a need to exist.

bjkeefe:

On the opium problem: does anyone have a thought about the idea of the US and other governments just buying the crop for a few years? When I think about how much money goes into the War on Drugs (tm), I wonder if an argument could be made that it would be cost-neutral to do this. I wonder also if in doing so, a little more trust could be built with Afghan farmers, so that as we try to encourage them to move to other crops, we'd have a better chance of selling them on the idea. Probably a naive thought, but I thought I'd throw it out there.

Look to Turkey! Or, the Senlis Council. AemJeff:

To me, this seems to add up to an unstable system that will irritate the people it needs to support, and which doesn't clearly move the situation toward the desired goal.

Isn't this a form of the perfect undermining the possible?

Quoting Baltimoron: Isn't this a form of the perfect undermining the possible?

Heh, nicely put. But I think I'm arguing it's not likely to work at all. To rephrase slightly: the implementation would be messy and counterproductive, and I don't see an endgame.

And I thought I was a pessimist when it came to Afghanistan. Of course I don't see any real strategic value, of that theater, to the US as opposed to the real strategic value of the Middle East.

Quoting bjkeefe: In fairness, EW's view of the situation is not exactly the one presented in the diavlog. I just say this lest ye be dissuaded from watching.

No doubt that it's a bleak situation, but I found the diavlog slightly more hopeful than EW's view.

Fair enough. Always best to go with specifics via trustworthy sources on the ground in theatre. Here's a couple good sources contributing to my grim view: 1) the most recent probably overly rosy take on the matter: http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/428/index.html (That's the PBS video or podcastable audio of "Afghanistan: The Forgotten War.") 2) Just Google "Sarah Chayes Afghanistan" for streamable interviews with Bill Moyers, Fresh Air's Terry Gross, On Point's Tom Ashbrook, WNYC's Leonard Lopate, etc. A former NPR reporter, she runs a cooperative in Afghanistan and gives a much more dimensional description of the plight of the population vis-a-vis resentment of Western Forces "collateral damage," the incredibly pervasive corruption at all levels of government, etc. She's very charming and personally upbeat, but the picture emerging is bleak, bleak, bleak. (She has her own website and wikipedia page.) And of course this doesn't even get us to the obvious insanity of trying to win a war there. Read the history. Stir in Pakistan. Reflect. Then

EW: Thanks for the pointers. To this:

And of course this doesn't even get us to the obvious insanity of trying to win a war there.

I can't much disagree. So, what do you propose as an alternative plan? Just leave?

Quoting piscivorous: Of course I don't see any real strategic value, of that theater, to the US as opposed to the real strategic value of the Middle East.

What about the tactical value, of being near the breeding ground for al Qaeda, as it were? Or having airbases there, given the proximity to other trouble spots? I'm ignoring here the obvious discontent the Afghans will have with such occupational thinking, of course. And I'll ask you the same question as I asked EW: If you don't think Afghanistan offers any hopeful outcomes, what do you think we ought to do about it?

Quoting bjkeefe: What about the tactical value, of being near the breeding ground for al Qaeda, as it were? Or having airbases there, given the proximity to other trouble spots?

Given that Afghanistan is land locked, and the air routes go over nations which are either downright hostile to the US or at best are 'partners' more than friends, may I suggest that any long term value of having military in Afghanistan have to be balanced against the difficulties? Where to go from here in Afghanistan, for the US (or anybody else?) Beats me - this does seem like a long term decent into chaos that will only be solved when the foreigners leave and some military junta takes control. One thing I do take issue with from the comments by Ms. Younes (or perhaps more accurately reported by her, from the Afghanis) is that the international community hasn't done enough. Sure, it would have been better if some of the Europeans coughed up more bodies in the beginning, and I have no doubt that the normal bureaucratic inefficiencies were involved in some of the aid, nevertheless I am not willing to throw good money after bad.

Quoting bjkeefe: EW:
[Regarding my "obvious insanity of trying to win a war in Afghanistan"]
I can't much disagree. So, what do you propose as an alternative plan? Just leave?

Beats me. EW

I can't much disagree. So, what do you propose as an alternative plan? Just leave?

Certainly leaving should be the short-to-mid term goal. We need timetables for both Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama, instead of chomping at the bit to escalate the war, should be ending it. It's not easy. There are dozens of difficult problems, including the risk of an even more failed state, Talibanization and major humanitarian crises. But the way out of the dilemma has to be one of peaceful resolution of conflicts. That commitment should be the point of departure. One of the statements I most admired from Obama was that he would talk to anyone. That was a very promising declaration of principles, which really did suggest a dramatically different, non-militaristic and non-hegemonic approach to America's role in the world. It was a moment when I think every progressive in the world said to him/herself, "This is guy really extraordinary." Was he just kidding? Maybe not. Ahmadinejad would be a great place to start with talking, since the Iranians are major players in Afghanistan.

Quoting Wonderment: Certainly leaving should be the short-to-mid term goal. We need timetables for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Obama, instead of chomping at the bit to escalate the war, should be ending it.

It's not easy. There are dozens of difficult problems, including the risk of an even more failed state, Talibanization and major humanitarian crises.

I think Obama sees the same problems that you do, and really thinks about Afghanistan more in terms of bringing sufficient resources to bear, with the aim of dealing with them as quickly as possible, rather as an "escalation" of war. It's the other guy who's "chomping at the bit" to make more war. You know who I'm talking about -- the guy who cares so little about domestic matters that he has to read the price of milk off a cheat sheet. Granted, Obama probably has a more hawkish view of matters, in general, than you do. Hell, I have a more hawkish view of matters that you do, and I'd be a millionaire if I had a nickel for every time I've been called a peacenik, or worse, over the course of my adult life.

More boots on the ground (resources), in Afghanistan, but it is also a matter of what kind of resources. The force requirements in Afghanistan are different than Iraq. When the most modern means of transportation, to get to many areas in Afghanistan, is horseback, sending standard mechanized infantry forces will allow for only partial coverage of the territory that needs to be possessed/occupied. Sufficient airlift can offset this to some extent but at the altitudes and in the terrain in which our forces will have to operate in begins to present challenges to the feasibility of supporting sufficient force structure for implementing effective counter insurgency doctrine.

A great companion piece to this Diavlog is Jackie Shire's chat a year ago with Brooking's Afg-boss, Jeremy Shapiro, who was freshly returned from Kabul at the time. It really throws into relief how much (or little) has changed in the last year.

Quoting bjkeefe: ...
And I'll ask you the same question as I asked EW: If you don't think Afghanistan offers any hopeful outcomes, what do you think we ought to do about it?

It is not so much a matter of does it offer any hopeful outcomes, but the time frame that will be required to get to a reasonable outcome.

pisc: Probably also a good idea to think of this in terms other than just force requirements and which military assets we should deploy.

Granted, Obama probably has a more hawkish view of matters, in general, than you do.

I'd be satisfied if Obama just listened to Republican lawyer Bruce Fein. I don't have the ding-a-link, but you probably remember the part where Bruce talked to Jane about the enormous gravity of waging war, how Congress really had better get it right because going to war is literally the granting of a license for what absent the license is mass murder, how Congressional responsibilities should not be abdicated in favor of the zeal of a POTUS "Decider." Bush and many Democratic enablers have created a situation in which we are at perpetual war with anybody and everybody we deem dangerous ("terrorists"), including, in principle, our own citizens who can be declared "enemy combatants" by a simple presidential assertion. Obama has suggested that he believes in Bush's war on terror at least to the extent that we ought to invade other countries (like Pakistan) anytime the president says so. He also wants to expand the Armed Forces, and he is committed to sending additional tens of thousands of troops to fight in Afghanistan, whether the

Wonderment: Not much to disagree with there, especially in the idealist sense. I will point out that when Obama takes office, he is going to be inheriting quite a few messes that he didn't make, most of which present limited options and obvious risks. Some of these will require, at the outset anyway, continued use of military force. Some will require at least a "big stick" presence, and some will require at least the clear indication that he's not going to let the US be pushed around, just because he thinks the previous administration handled things all wrong. There's a difference between saying "all options remain on the table" and being a shoot-from-the-hip cowboy. It's fundamental to basic negotiating strategy, especially considering some of those with whom we have to negotiate. I will also point out that he has no chance of getting elected by running on a message that you would be anywhere near 100% happy with. I know you know this, but I'm saying it anyway. Finally, I will point out that the abdication of responsibility on the part of the Congress is hardly on Obama. Their refusal to insist on their sovereign Constitutional authority to

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